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Abstract 
 
Economists argue that land rent taxation is an ideal form of taxation as it causes no deadweight losses 
and has therefore no adverse effects on growth. Nevertheless, pure land rent taxation is rarely applied 
and, if so, revenues collected remain rather small. Property taxes share some of the characteristics of 
land taxes and generate small revenues, inter alia also in developing countries. This report revisits the 
case of land taxation for developing countries that are often characterized by large informal sectors, low 
public spending and poor tax or land administration institutions. We first provide a comprehensive 
overview of direct and indirect welfare and development effects of land rent taxation, ranging from 
increased efficiency in the fiscal system and in financing infrastructure, over environmental effects due 
to changes in land use to distributional effects. Barriers and constraints of implementing land taxes are 
also discussed, particularly the existence of a land registry, the role of administrative costs, compliance, 
evasion and political economy aspects. We extend this review with an in-depth analysis of current land 
tax systems and reform options in six case study countries. For four countries, we provide an additional 
quantitative analysis based on micro-simulations with household data that allow us to quantify revenues 
and distributional effects of various land tax regimes. Our main finding is that land taxes provide a large 
and untapped potential for financing governments. Formalizing and securing land tenure by establishing 
a land registry is a pre-condition that further provides substantial co-benefits for various sustainable 
development objectives. Widespread concerns regarding the feasibility and costs of implementing land 
taxes are rarely valid, as land taxes are in these aspects comparable to other taxes. Political will and 
investment in the quality of administration are, however, decisive. Considering some key principles in 
designing the land tax can help reduce administrative costs, avoid adverse distributional effects and 
increase compliance.  
  
 
 
Foreword 
 
Land is central to many of today’s policy questions and increasingly recognized as such. Projections of a 
strongly increasing demand for land-based products, increased claims on land for bio-energy and urban 
expansion and the acknowledgment that land is needed to conserve biodiversity and mitigate climate 
change are leading to increased scarcity.  The recent initiative by the UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD) to develop a Global Land Outlook seeks to highlight these challenges and find 
ways to improve global land use efficiency.  
Land taxes are not the first thing policymakers think of when considering interventions to improve 
global land use efficiency. To the contrary, land taxes are almost automatically assumed too complicated 
to implement, aggravated by uncertainties on their potential distributional effects. This holds for both 
developed and developing countries, international cooperation being potentially very useful in this 
domain.  
The aim of this report is to assess the potential of land taxes and provide policymakers with an idea of 
their potential impact, feasibility, and barriers to implement. In this, we pay attention to the potential 
costs and benefits of land tax implementation, the possible distributional impacts, and the feasibility of 
introducing land taxes as well. The report does not pay attention to political feasibility, which is highly 
context specific and about which few general statements can be made. 
The outcomes indicate that in many countries the introduction of land taxes would not only be feasible 
but an efficient and effective form of taxation, limiting distortions to economic decisions and providing a 
stable tax base. Distributional consequences are manageable and no more difficult than for other taxes, 
for example by exempting part of the land rents from the tax. Moreover, land taxes may help in 
incentivizing more efficient and sustainable use of land. With the global community committed to 
supporting developing countries in strengthening their capacity for domestic revenue mobilization 
(Addis Ababa declaration 2015), this report strengthens the case to make land taxes part of that effort.  
It is important to note that the study, which we commissioned to the Mercator Research Institute on 
Global Commons and Climate Change, is really a first assessment of the order of magnitude of potential 
effects and impacts of land taxes, and exploration of the factors constraining land tax implementation 
and feasibility. 
For us, the report is an important building block in our aim to explore effective pathways for stimulating 
Inclusive Green Growth in international cooperation, and contributes to the analysis of intervention 
strategies for the Global Land Outlook, in which PBL cooperates with the UNCCD.  
We hope you will appreciate this report’s findings as much as we did. 
 
Jetske Bouma & Stefan van der Esch 
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
 
 
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency is the Dutch national institute for 
strategic policy analysis in the fields of the environment, nature and spatial planning.  
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1. Introduction 
Land rent taxation has been suggested since the days of Adam Smith as an efficient form of taxation 
since it can be designed in a way that does not distort the supply of the tax base. Conceptually, a rent is 
the excess amount earned by a factor over the cost necessary to supply it (Wessel 1967). Hence, the land 
rent constitutes that part of the land rental value or land price that is solely associated with the scarcity 
of land at a specific location.1 While the topic of land rent taxation is an old one in economics (A. Smith 
1776; Ricardo 1817; George 1879), several important developments of the twenty-first century have 
renewed interest in it. One of these trends is an increase in the concentration of wealth (Piketty 2014), 
which has been attributed to a large extent to rents, in particular land rents (Stiglitz 2015). A recent 
study confirmed that land rents grow substantially stronger than construction costs and constitute an 
increasing share of housing prices (Knoll, Schularick, and Steger 2017). A second trend is an increasing 
demand for land due to population growth and new economic uses such as biofuels (Lambin and 
Meyfroidt 2011; P. Smith et al. 2010; Brend’Amour et al. 2016). A third trend is a decreasing supply of 
land through degradation (Blaikie and Brookfield 2015) and climate change (Barros et al. 2014) which 
may further increase land rents if technological change in land use efficiency remains slow.  
These new developments are particularly important for developing countries where the agricultural 
sector has a large share of value added and employment. The aim of this paper is to assess the scope, 
benefits and caveats of land rent taxation for developing countries. We provide a conceptual analysis 
based on a comprehensive literature review as well as empirical and institutional in-depth analyses of 
extended land taxation for selected case study countries. 
Figure 1 Optimal size of Government (own depiction)  
 
Source: Own illustration based on (Karras 1997). The optimal size of government is lower if the instruments used to raise revenues are highly 
distortionary and discourage growth. The optimal size of government should increase if public goods and other social goals that require funding are 
included in the social welfare function. 
An important motivation for studying land rent taxation in the context of developing countries 
constitutes the specific institutional settings that characterize their fiscal systems. Some estimates 
suggest that the optimal size of government ranges between 20 and 25 percent of GDP (Karras 1997) 
(see Fig. 1). The optimal size of government is lower if the instruments to raise revenues are highly 
distortionary and discourage growth. The optimal size of government should increase if public goods 
and other social goals that require funding are included in the social welfare function. As a typical 
pattern, the size of government, measured as share of tax revenues on GDP, tends to increase with GDP 
                                                             
1 In the case of agricultural land, land quality is partly under the control of the land owner which needs special consideration. In 
that case, the annualized costs of private investments in land quality need to be subtracted from the rental price of land to get 
the land rent component. 
Non-GDP related public goods Inequality / redistribution 
Distortive tax instruments 
Welfare 
Tax / GDP 
     2 
 
 
 
 
(see dotted regression line in Fig. 2). Countries with a strong role of the state, e.g. formerly planned 
economies and northern countries, tend to lie above the average relationship. On the other hand, for 
resource-rich countries where government revenues consist of direct incomes from resource rents, tax 
to GDP ratios are significantly below the average. The low tax-to-GDP ratios of many developing 
countries are particularly striking against the financing needs for achieving other social and 
development objectives that require increased investments (Schlegelmilch, Speck, and Maro 2010). 
Public investment in infrastructure related to health, education, social security, access to water, 
sanitation or electricity is at a low level for many African countries (Yepes, Pierce, and Foster 2009). The 
low tax-to-GDP ratio also reflects the challenge developing countries are facing with respect to weak tax 
administration, low taxpayer morale, high corruption and a high share of the informal sector (IMF et al. 
2011) – all issues that effectively increase the (welfare) cost of raising public revenues through taxes.2  
Figure 2. Tax burden as share of GDP. 
 
Source: Own illustration based on 2015 macro-economic data from the Heritage Foundation (2015). Countries with large fossil resource exports 
are labeled. 
Economic theory provides a strong case for land rent taxation to improve the efficiency of the economy 
and the tax system (Oates and Schwab 2009a). This is important, as distortionary taxes have been 
shown to slow development (Y. Lee and Gordon 2005). Due to their small distorting impact on the 
economy, land taxes could help increase domestic resource mobilization, which is one of the main goals 
of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (United Nations 2015).  
Land taxes can be designed in two basic ways, namely as land value taxes or as land unit taxes. The 
former is a non-distortionary form of taxation, which would allow governments to make less use of 
distortionary taxes like labor, capital, consumption or trade taxes. The latter would also transfer part of 
the associated rent to the government budget but may additionally discourage the use of land with a 
value lower than the unit tax (Brandt 2014; Kalkuhl and Edenhofer 2016). This land with low economic 
value often has great importance for ecosystem services, in particular for water management.3 The land-
sparing effect of unit taxes could therefore increase welfare if negative externalities are associated with 
the use of land and open space, an aspect particularly immanent to urban sprawl (Brueckner 2001; 
Banzhaf and Lavery 2010; Bento, Franco, and Kaffine 2011) but also deforestation (DeFries et al. 2010).  
Two further aspects are relevant when assessing the role of land taxes for improving fiscal efficiency, 
public good provision and incentives for land use: the distributional incidence as well as the institutional 
feasibility, or costs. If land ownership is concentrated among rich households, or revenues are used in a 
way that favors the poorest segments of society, a land rent tax would in addition be progressive and 
directly reduce inequality or poverty. It could, however, also provoke high resistance by well-organized 
                                                             
2 Other research emphasized that low tax-to-GDP ratios might also be driven by crowding out of development aid (Benedek et 
al. 2014) although this assertion is also contested (Morrissey 2015). 
3 A comprehensive assessment of services provided by marginal land prepared in the upcoming report “Land degradation and 
restoration” by the Intergovernmental science-policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). 
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and influential social groups, thus impeding its effectiveness. Additionally, if the administrative burden 
of implementing land rent taxation turns out to be excessive, the efficiency advantage of land taxes 
might be reduced or even lost. 
In this paper, we first review in Section 2 the potential of land taxes to increase social welfare by 
focusing on (i) the fiscal efficiency effects, (ii) the needs for increased government spending for public 
good provision of high social value, (iii) the possible environmental impacts on land use, and (iv) the 
distributional implications. Fostering economic growth and public infrastructure as well as reducing 
environmental externalities, inequality and poverty can be thought of having positive effects on social 
welfare. We label the effects of land taxes on these dimensions of social welfare as benefits, 
acknowledging, however, that the precise weighting and prioritizing of these dimensions depend on 
normative considerations that should be subject to deliberative processes within societies (Jakob and 
Edenhofer 2014). We contrast these potential benefits with the obstacles to land rent taxation, which 
are the costs of implementation that arise due to administrative costs for running land registries and 
assessing land values as well as poor compliance due to weak institutional capacity, in particular, 
corruption. A synthesis of the literature review is provided at the end of Section 2. 
Based on the literature review and conceptual analysis in Section 2, we develop a country typology 
based on easily accessible proxy indicators for various benefit and cost dimensions. Constructing Pareto 
frontiers, the typology aims to identify countries with preferential benefit-cost ratios, i.e. where 
implementing or extending land rent taxation can be expected to be particularly promising.  
The typology also provides a transparent way for selecting case-study countries that are analyzed in 
more detail in Section 4. We assess the distribution of agricultural and urban land rents among 
household and conduct a micro-simulation of various land tax schemes. The quantitative analysis allows 
us to estimate the total revenues that could be collected as well as their distributional incidence. We 
further elaborate on the status quo on land taxes and potential reform options. Finally, Section 5 
concludes by summarizing the major insights from the article and outlining major design options and 
policy recommendations for land tax reforms in developing countries. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Land taxes: key definitions and principles 
There are two basic types of land taxes: land value taxes and unit taxes (see Fig. 3). As the names 
indicate, the first is proportional to the value of the land, such that a piece of land of a given size is taxed 
more at the center of the city than in a remote rural area, while the second taxes all pieces of land of a 
given size equally. The type of tax to be chosen depends on the objective of the government. When 
several objectives are pursued simultaneously, the optimal policy could be a mix of the two instruments. 
If the land rent constitutes the land value, a land value tax (of less than 100 percent) is non-distorting in 
the sense of not reducing the tax base. It is for this reason that it is an attractive source of revenue for 
the government. Contrary to common perception, however, a land value tax is not neutral in the sense of 
not affecting economic decisions. For land-owning households, the land value tax causes a wealth effect, 
meaning that both their total expenditure and the composition of expenditure may change. As not all 
households receive the same share of their income from land rents, land value taxation also has 
important distributional consequences. Some households are affected more than others. Both the direct 
effect of these distributional consequences and possible corrections for it need to be understood before 
a land value tax is implemented. 
     4 
 
 
 
 
If land is an open-access resource, a unit tax on land will mean that all land with a marginal productivity 
below the tax rate will not be acquired (Figure 3) This is particularly relevant if land can be appropriated 
by clearing and cultivating open-access forest area (Kalkuhl and Edenhofer 2016). A unit tax will in this 
case not have the non-distortionary property of a land value tax. While the value tax thus corresponds to 
the government objective of raising government revenue in an efficient way, the unit tax corresponds to 
environmental or spatial planning objectives. 
Figure 3 Unit vs. value tax 
 
Note: The agricultural land rent decreases, e.g., with distance to consumers and wilderness area, or pristine forest, prevails where the land rent 
becomes zero. Upper panel: Case of land scarcity (no wilderness area); lower panel: Case of land abundance (wilderness area prevails at zero land 
rent). Source: Adapted from Kalkuhl and Edenhofer 2016.  
 
Table 1. Overview of major land-related taxes 
Type of tax Relation to land rent 
Land value tax Tax on pure land rents (if quality of land is exogenous to landowner) 
Unit tax Tax on pure land rents (tax higher than the land rent is possible) 
Property tax Tax on part of pure land rents Part of the pure land rent plus tax on structures (buildings); equal 
share. 
Split rate tax Tax on part of pure land rents plus tax on structures (buildings); equal or different shares. 
Stamp tax and 
transaction taxes 
Transactions of property - land and structures (buildings). 
No direct land rent taxation. 
 
More common than land taxes are, however, property and split-rate taxes which tax the land rent as well 
as the structure on land (including buildings). Property taxes are ad-valorem taxes on the value of a 
property (land including structure, i.e. a building). Split-rate taxes are differentiated taxes on land and 
structure with two different tax rates. As these taxes apply additionally to structure, they have an 
allocative effect by reducing investments in structure.  
Land rent 
Inverse land quality (distance, low productivity,…) 
total land area 
value tax 
Unit tax 
land sparing 
Land rent total land area 
value tax 
Unit tax 
Inverse land quality (distance, low productivity,…) 
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Table 1 summarizes the major tax types. It also includes taxes on land and property transactions that are 
widespread but not strongly linked to land rent taxation. 
2.2. Efficiency and growth effects  
Most countries finance their government budget to a large extent by taxing labor income, capital income 
and consumption (in the form of value added tax in particular) (Johansson et al. 2008). Since these taxes 
make it less profitable to provide capital and/or labor, households react by providing less of these 
production factors. This reaction has been shown to be particularly strong for labor income taxes 
(Feldstein 1999; Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002). While labor taxation reduces work incentives in developed 
countries, labor taxes induce a shift of labor from the formal to the informal sector in developing 
countries (Ulyssea 2010; Meghir, Narita, and Robin 2015).  
A widely used concept to measure the welfare costs of distortionary taxation is the marginal costs of 
public funds, MCF (Browning 1976). Given a government budget, the MCF measures the tax burden plus 
the marginal welfare costs associated with a marginal increase in tax revenue while neglecting potential 
beneficial welfare effects of government spending. Thus, a MCF of one indicates a perfectly efficient tax 
system, as raising one additional dollar for the government costs only one dollar to society. Estimates of 
MCFs typically range between 1.2 and 1.5, depending on the country and specific tax considered to raise 
public revenues (Auriol and Warlters 2012). Hence, raising additional government funds through taxes 
causes 20 to 50 percent of additional loss in consumer welfare. In a recent study, (Auriol and Warlters 
2012) estimate MCFs for 38 African countries, finding that costs are highest for capital and labor taxes 
(on average 1.60 and 1.51, respectively), then import taxes (average 1.18) and finally domestic 
consumption taxes (average 1.11).  
The supply of land on the other hand is inelastic to a value tax (of less than 100 percent) since it is taxed 
independent of whether or not it is used in production. This inelastic supply of land makes it an efficient 
source of taxation, implying a MCF of one (Oates and Schwab 2009a). The non-distortionary nature of 
land value taxation was originally discovered by Adam Smith and has been analyzed and advocated for 
by many economists when advising governments on reforming their tax systems (see, e.g. (Mirrlees and 
Adam 2011) for the UK or (Henry et al. 2009) for Australia). 
Economic theory has identified further income and growth effects of land taxation related to 
households’ saving and investment behavior. The first is related to the portfolio effect discovered by 
(Feldstein 1977): households typically use some of their labor income to save for retirement. These 
savings are used to purchase assets like capital and land. When land value is taxed, it becomes more 
attractive to invest in capital and as a consequence, capital accumulates faster. In a situation where 
capital is under-accumulated, it is welfare increasing to intentionally trigger the portfolio effect 
(Edenhofer, Mattauch, and Siegmeier 2015). The second effect of land taxes on growth is related to 
inequality of land ownership. The model of (Galor, Moav, and Vollrath 2009) shows that strong 
inequality of land ownership has a negative effect on economic development.4 The reason is that large-
scale landowners have an interest in discouraging human capital investments of the rural population in 
order to keep rural wages low. Reducing land value through taxation might correct these harmful 
incentives and thus promote growth. 
While economic theory is useful for understanding and explaining the mechanisms of how land taxes 
influence economic development, empirical literature on their relevance is rather scant. One reason is the 
lack of data, as solid econometric analyses require large variability of land tax schemes over space and 
time. Property and split-rate taxes are common in practice and are thus more frequently analyzed. While 
they are not as efficient as taxes on pure land rent, property taxes are considered to be less distortionary 
                                                             
4 Using a panel on GDP and land inequality data, (Fort 2007) finds evidence that inequality in land ownership affects growth 
negatively. 
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than income taxes (OECD 2010). An empirical study on 21 OECD countries from 1971 to 2004 by 
(Arnold 2008) finds that taxes on immoveable property have the smallest growth reducing effects 
compared to any other form of taxation (even consumption taxes). In addition, a recent IMF paper 
(Norregaard 2013) notices the renewed interest in taxes on immovable factors, such as land, and 
emphasizes that shifting the tax system to more revenue collection from property taxation can indeed 
spur economic efficiency and growth.  
2.3. Environmental and land-use effects  
In many countries, the amount of land used for economic purposes extends at the cost of natural 
ecosystems, in particular forests (DeFries et al. 2010). Ecosystems provide, however, benefits to human 
well-being as well as economic production (De Groot et al. 2012) and are therefore relevant for social 
welfare. While the extent of conservation depends on other social goals (Jakob and Edenhofer 2014; 
Edenhofer et al. 2014), completely neglecting environmental externalities constitutes a welfare loss. A 
government which intends to preserve these ecosystems could employ a unit tax on agricultural land or 
deforested land as an instrument to change land use dynamics (Kalkuhl and Edenhofer 2016). Such a 
land tax could also reduce appropriation of open-access land for agricultural purposes. While agricultural 
land taxes can help reduce overall pressure on ecosystems, they are likely unable to conserve specific 
ecosystems or environmental sites. They are therefore best understood as complementary policies to 
protected areas, payments for ecosystems services or subsidies on forest conservation (Barua, Uusivuori, 
and Kuuluvainen 2012; Barua et al. 2014; Busch et al. 2012).  
A similar case for land taxes applies to urban space. When open space contributes to well-being, taxing 
land development becomes welfare-increasing (Bento, Franco, and Kaffine 2011). Likewise, replacing 
property taxes which discourage investments in higher density by land value taxes may also help to 
reduce urban sprawl, as empirical evidence from the US suggests (Banzhaf and Lavery 2010). 
(Plassmann and Tideman 2000) emphasized that land taxes may actually increase investments in 
buildings. A rather large literature explores the extent to which property taxes affect investments on 
urban land. (Song and Zenou 2006), for example, derived from US-wide panel regressions that 
urbanized areas with higher property taxes consume less total space. Hence, the empirical evidence 
suggests a tendency of land taxes and, to a lesser extent, property taxes to put land to its most efficient 
use.  
Contrary to the context of urban sprawl, empirical research on the land-conserving and investment-
increasing effects of land taxes for agricultural land is not available. While drawing a parallel with the 
urban context suggests that land taxes may also limit extensification and increase intensification, the 
precise environmental effectiveness of this policy still needs to be explored.  
2.4. Distributional effects  
While most research on land and property taxes focuses on their allocative effects, distributional effects 
are rarely investigated (Norregaard 2013). This is surprising as distributional effects are important for 
understanding welfare implications but also for their political feasibility. 
One effect which has been described in the literature is the intergenerational effect (Koethenbuerger 
and Poutvaara 2009). When households save for their retirement by buying land with the intention of 
using the land rent as a means of living, then land would be predominantly owned by those households 
that are near or in retirement at the time of the introduction of the tax. They would lose a substantial 
amount of their savings due to the reduced net land rents. At the same time, they would not benefit 
directly from a potential reduction in labor income taxes. 
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A second effect concerns vertical equity, that is, the distributive effect among households with different 
levels of wealth. If land ownership increases proportionally or more than proportionally with wealth, 
then a land tax would be progressive. According to (Stiglitz 2015), rents are generally highly 
concentrated among the rich. In this case, rent taxation would have a progressive effect. However, 
according to (Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore 2006), land ownership in the US increases in absolute terms 
in wealth, but decreases in relative terms. While the potential regressivity is an important point to 
consider, better data would be required as (Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore 2006) for example do not have 
data on land owned by businesses. The in-depth analysis of specific case study countries in this article 
will contribute to these gaps.5 
A third effect concerns horizontal equity, that is, the distributive effect among households with equal 
levels of wealth. When two households with the same amount of wealth own different amounts of land, 
a land tax would require them to pay different amounts of taxes in spite of their equal ability to pay. 
Considering the special case of switching from taxing properties to taxing only land value, Plummer 
(2010) identifies horizontal equity as an important potential concern. 
Governments commonly understand very well that every tax reform creates winners and losers. To avoid 
drastic changes, a land tax can be designed according to local circumstances. For example, in places with 
dynamic land values, i.e. near urban areas where rapid development is taking place, unit taxes may in the 
long-run undervalue location values and raise equity concerns (Rao 2008). Some countries have 
property taxes and thus, the implementation of a land tax should be ideally done in combination with a 
tax shift – i.e. gradually introduced through a split tax rate, where there is a simultaneous decrease of 
rates for structures and increase of land value rates (Oates and Schwab 2009b). Finally, careful 
management of the timing of property tax reform (assessment ratio or rates) and appraisals procedures 
can prevent a simultaneous increase in the different factors affecting the tax bill (Bourassa 2009).  
2.5. Practical requirements and feasibility constraints for 
land taxation 
After emphasizing the impacts on welfare, we now turn to the transaction costs and implementation 
aspects of land taxation. 
2.5.1.  Pre-condition: Land registry and cadaster 
Any kind of land or property taxes require a system of land registration, or cadaster, which includes 
fiscal, social, economic, legal and environmental information on land and its owner. 6 The costs of 
                                                             
5 Equity effects can arise in a very concentrated form. Consider an investor buying a piece of land for a business project. If a land 
tax is introduced after the purchase the investor effectively pays twice for the same land, once when buying it and a second time 
in the form of taxes. In the light of this possibility, several aspects need to be considered for a comprehensive assessment of the 
equity effect. First, while the investor has additional cost through the tax reform he will likely also have benefits, for example in 
the form of lower taxes on other inputs or in the form of better infrastructure. Second, any tax reform generates additional 
costs for some people. A tax reform including land taxes is not unique in this respect. Third, if the business project was 
profitable before it will also be profitable after the tax reform. The social cost of a potential bankruptcy would thus be balanced 
by an opportunity for a new investor. And finally, a well-designed tax reform will seek to be balanced in terms of equity. A 
disproportionate burden of a land lax on some households is a legitimate reason to set lower tax rates than would be optimal 
from a point of view of efficiency. 
6 It is worth mentioning that land might formally be owned by the government (e.g. as it is the case in Ethiopia or Vietnam). In 
such cases, users of land may have to pay a fee to the government which then is effectively a tax on land. If farmers or dwellers 
can use the land for free according to local or national allocation principles, the introduction of a usage fee is conceptually 
equivalent to a land tax. Hence, the case of governmental ownership of land might not fundamentally alter the analysis on the 
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introducing land registration can in some cases be considerable (Deininger and Feder 2009). The fact 
that a large number of low income countries have property taxes (see Table 2.2 in (Richard Miller Bird 
and Slack 2004)) implies that the costs for establishing cadastral requirements for land taxation are not 
prohibitive.  
Establishing formal and transparent land rights through a land registry has, however, a number of co-
benefits that are worth mentioning. There is growing empirical evidence that secure land rights increase 
agricultural investments as well as sustainable land use practices (Abdulai, Owusu, and Goetz 2011; 
Abdulai and Goetz 2014; Lawry et al. 2016). Further benefits include improved land access for women 
(Ali, Deininger, and Goldstein 2014), with improved educational outcomes for children (Matz and 
Narciso 2010), and reduced deforestation (Robinson, Holland, and Naughton-Treves 2014; Etongo et al. 
2015). Because of the various benefits, establishing tenure rights has become an objective of 
governments and international organizations (FAO 2012), independent from its instrumental role for 
tapping an additional source of government revenue.  
2.5.2.  Administrative costs of land taxes 
Setting up a land registry, assessing property and land values and enforcing tax payments requires 
administrative staff and equipment. When administrative costs are high, the efficiency advantages of 
land taxes might be reversed. The case of prohibitive administrative costs is often made for developing 
countries: Khan (2001), for example, argues that land value taxation “poses serious administrative 
problems since the cadastral information about location, area, quality, market or rental value, and 
ownership must be determined before the tax can be assessed and collected”. Similarly, Bird (2011) 
writes that land taxes are “surprisingly costly”, since the land value needs to be determined and payment 
needs to be enforced.  
There are no comprehensive assessments on the administrative costs of land taxes but we review in the 
following the available evidence, which suggests that costs are not necessarily prohibitive. We can 
distinguish between fixed costs like setting up a land registry or cadaster and recurrent costs like 
maintaining and updating a cadaster, valuing property etc.  
With respect to set-up costs, a closer look at World Bank projects for creating land registries reveals a 
rough indication of the scale of these costs: For various countries, these range typically between 10 and 
100 mln USD (see Table 7 in the Appendix). A project for the creation of a land registry in Ghana, for 
example, was about 55 mln USD (approx. 0.1 percent of GDP) and in Laos about 28 mln USD (approx. 1 
percent of GDP)7. A World Bank project on the long-term development of Indonesia’s institutional 
capacity for land administration had an up-front cost of 140 mln USD (approx. 0.1 percent of GDP) 
which are less than 3 percent of the total annual land rent flows we estimated in Section 4. These 
numbers suggest that set-up costs are relevant but by far not decisive as they occur only once and 
constitute a vanishing share of national GDP. 
Administrative costs of land rent taxation refer typically to recurrent costs which are defined by the 
costs of assessing land value and collecting taxes, and which are dominated by costs of assessors and 
employees in the tax administration. Only a few studies exist that quantify these costs: In the case of 
Croatia, administrative costs as a percentage of property tax raised varied enormously, between 5-50 
percent (Blažić, Stašić, and Drezgić 2014). Higher costs are usually paid by smaller municipalities that 
can rely less on economies of scale in assessing property value (Blažić, Stašić, and Drezgić 2014). A 
comprehensive study on property taxes in Latin American municipalities by (De Cesare 2010) revealed 
substantially lower costs of one to 20 percent of taxes raised, with 6 percent costs for a median 
municipality. The large variability of administrative costs suggests that there is substantial potential for 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
effects of land taxation as long as the economic decisions on land use (and the financial revenues from using land) are 
associated to individuals. 
7 The cost as share of GDP refer to the years when the project was closed. 
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decreasing administrative costs. As tax rates are often below one percent of the property value, applying 
higher tax rates can further reduce the cost-to-collection ratio as revenues are increased but costs are 
hardly affected.  
Total administrative costs of land taxes need to be compared with the administrative costs plus the 
marginal costs of public funds of other taxes. The administrative costs of the entire tax system of 
industrialized countries ranges between 0.5 and 2 percent, of Latin American countries around two 
percent and of African countries between 1-3 percent (Auriol and Warlters 2012). Hence, with respect 
to administrative costs, land taxes tend to be slightly more expensive, but not excessively expensive. As 
administrative costs are one order of magnitude lower than the welfare costs due to distortions by labor 
and capital taxes (Auriol), administrative costs are more than compensated by efficiency gains. 
There are various ways to reduce administrative costs by optimizing land value appraisal cycles: while 
short cycles are costly, cycles that are too infrequent lead to outdated cadaster values which reduce tax 
revenues when property values increase strongly. In practice, appraisal cycles range between every year 
to very long periods (e.g. once there is a market transaction) with most appraisal cycles in the US 
occurring every 4-6 years (Oregon Department of Revenue 2012) and less frequent ones in many 
European countries (Fernandez Milan, Kapfer, and Creutzig 2016). While administrative costs may be 
particularly prohibitive where land values are low and/or land plots are small, computational (hybrid) 
methods and especially geospatial regression models have the potential to reduce costs of mass 
appraisal (McCluskey and Anand 1999; McCluskey et al. 2013). In this context, technology could make a 
difference. Brazil for example introduced the "Rural Environmental Registry", which obliged landowners 
to register their land electronically (Nepstad et al. 2014; Duchelle et al. 2014; L’Roe et al. 2016). While 
the exact implementation will have to be adjusted to country specific characteristics, the basic idea could 
become a role model: administrative costs are reduced by actively involving landowners. Landowners are 
rewarded for their cooperation with services provided by the government, among others, in the form of 
formal land rights. 
In developed countries, land value taxation has been found to be a demanding, but feasible form of 
taxation. It is demanding since the total value of a property that can be assessed in market transactions 
is composed of the land value and the value of improvements, in particular buildings located on the land. 
Sophisticated techniques allow for estimating both components with satisfactory accuracy (Bell, 
Bowman, and German 2009). In the United Kingdom, the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) is successful in 
determining land value, see Chapter 16 of (Mirrlees and Adam 2011). In Germany, for example, land 
value maps are created and updated by expert groups. Even if land value is assessed with error, it is still 
less distorting than a property tax (Chapman, Johnston, and Tyrrell 2009). Developing countries might 
thus tap into the knowledge and experience available in developed countries. 
Another way of reducing administrative costs is to use unit taxes which might also be locally 
differentiated to account for different land values. As it is not necessary to assess the value of every plot 
of land, administrative costs and cadastral requirements are low and, thus, favorable for developing 
countries (Khan 2001). Several developing countries—including Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Malaysia—use 
unit taxes and others move towards a land value tax, by adjusting the unit tax by the availability of 
irrigation and quality of soils (Khan 2001). Other examples that are discussed in more detail below 
include Vietnam and Rwanda.  
2.5.3.  Compliance 
An important reason that real world tax systems differ significantly from the tax systems considered 
„optimal“ by theoretical economists, in particular in developing countries, is tax evasion and non-
compliance (Gordon and Li 2009). Since tax evasion depends on how well a tax base can be observed, 
observable tax bases should be taxed even if this would not be optimal otherwise. This argument is used 
by Boadway et al. (1994) and Richter and Boadway (2005) to explain the existence of commodity 
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taxation in practice. Liu (2013) considers gasoline taxes an attractive source of revenue since gasoline 
consumption is easy to observe. Likewise, tariffs can be superior to VAT due to tax evasion (Emran and 
Stiglitz 2005). In this line of argumentation, taxes on property and land are difficult to evade since the 
tax base is highly visible, immovable and can be easily verified by property assessors (Kenny and Winer 
2006; Johnson et al. 2014).  
There is neither evidence nor agreement on whether land or property taxes are in general more prone to 
tax evasion, non-compliance or corruption than other taxes. A major problem of property taxes in 
developing countries is, however, compliance and incomplete coverage in the cadaster. For Latin 
American municipalities, for example, 87 percent of existing properties are recorded in the cadaster on 
average but coverage varies strongly between municipalities (De Cesare 2010). Typically, small plots, 
land of little value, and agricultural land are not recorded in the cadaster (Kelly 2000). As the value of 
such land is low, revenue losses due to imperfect coverage might be lower than the actual coverage gap. 
A more severe problem than coverage of the land registry is, however, the ability of the tax 
administration to enforce tax payments. 25 percent of the municipalities considered in (De Cesare 2010) 
collected more than 80 percent of the assessed tax while on average only two-thirds of the assessed tax 
amount was collected. For African countries, enforcement rates tend to be lower while for Indonesia, 65 
to 79 percent of the assessed tax is actually collected (Kelly 2000). While these compliance ratios seem 
to be low, they are not necessarily worse than those of alternative taxes as non-compliance is not only 
an issue for land or property taxes: a striking example of poor tax compliance is the VAT in Uganda 
where only 50 percent of the potential revenues are collected (Hutton, Thackray, and Wingender 2014). 
Tariffs are also subject to substantial evasion  for developing, emerging and developed countries alike 
(Levin and Widell 2014; Fisman and Wei 2004; Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova 2008; Javorcik and 
Narciso 2008).  
While corruption tends to be a minor reason for low collection rates, taxpayer morale and missing 
incentives and fines are considered the major cause for non-compliance (De Cesare 2010; Kelly 2000). 
Tax compliance depends in general on crucial design aspects like taxpayer segmentation and use of 
third-party information, but also consideration of behavioral aspects of taxpayers that are related to 
social norms, intrinsic motivation, perceived fairness etc. (IMF 2015). Manaf et al. (2005) find that 
compliance of land taxes in Malaysia depends on the perception of the fairness of the tax. (Del Carpio 
2013) analyzes within a field experiment in Peru several ways of nudging landowners to pay their 
property taxes. The importance of the quality of the administration is therefore key and the literature 
has identified various ways and lessons learned on how to increase compliance (Kelly 1993; Kelly 2000; 
Richard Miller Bird and Slack 2004; Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez, and Youngman 2008; Bandyopadhyay 
2014). 
2.5.4.  Acceptance and political feasibility 
One popular reason as to why land taxation is difficult to implement is the “strong and vocal opposition” 
they face, in particular by “the rural elite” (Khan 2001). This is easily understandable as an expression of 
Olson’s asymmetry (Olson 1965): if land ownership is concentrated, landowners have a strong incentive 
to lobby against land taxes. This might make it more difficult to implement such taxes, compared to e.g. 
taxes on consumption, which result in a more distributed incidence. 
However, if land is more evenly distributed, land taxes might be subject to opposition. High volatility in 
agricultural revenues adds an additional difficulty for farmers to comply. Fixed annual payments can 
arguably decrease rural livelihood security, and even lead to revolts (Scott 1977). Availability of 
appropriate insurance tools like rainfall indices can be one way of easing temporal liquidity constraints 
and reducing revenue risk (Karlan et al. 2014). 
The literature has also identified enabling conditions for land taxation in developing countries. As with 
every tax, land taxes obviously and directly reduce household incomes. A primary approach for increasing 
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acceptance is therefore emphasizing the direct and indirect benefits through the revenues collected. The 
provision of co-benefits, like formal land rights, can increase support (Booth 2014). Local acceptance for 
the tax seems to be decisive as well – it can be increased due to higher transparency on the use of the 
tax revenues. According to Skinner (1991) the tax is more likely to be supported if it is collected by local 
governments so that it is easier to track how its revenues are used. In addition, Booth (2014) finds that 
“if the revenues were not just kept by local governments, but used for specific projects which would be 
of direct benefit to rural people”, acceptance can be increased further.  
Redirecting local revenues from land taxation for local investments is closely related to the idea of fiscal 
decentralization.8 Kelly (2000) argues that central governments might be reluctant to empower local 
governments through fiscal decentralization and property tax reform. Other political constraints might 
relate to investments in land and protection of investors profit margins (see Box 1 below).  
  
                                                             
8 So far, however, only weak evidence exists that fiscal decentralization is generally conducive for growth, service provision or 
poverty reduction (Ahmad and Brosio 2009): Akai and Sakata (2002) identify a positive effect of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth which is in contrast to previous findings that relied on poor data (Zhang and Zou 1998; Davoodi and Zou 1998). The data in Akai and Sakata (2002) included a time frame which includes not only periods of rapid growth. In addition, 
the data uses a culturally homogeneous region (the United States) in order to remove spurious results due to cultural 
differences. Thornton (2007) by contrast points out that these and other preceding empirical studies are flawed since they don't 
distinguish between "administrative" and "substantive" decentralization. Correcting for this, he finds that "the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth is not statistically significant". Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) argue that by the 
time of the publication of their paper, neither the empirical nor theoretical understanding of fiscal decentralization was reliable 
enough to support policy advice. The inconclusiveness seems to continue to this date: Gemmell et al. (2013) find that spending 
decentralization "is associated" with lower growth and the opposite is true for revenue decentralization. Baskaran and Feld (2013), by contrast, find that fiscal decentralization is actually unrelated to economic growth. 
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Box 1: Land taxes and (foreign) investments into land 
Recent years have, perhaps as part of a strategy to adjust to increased global food demand, witnessed growing acquisition of 
agricultural land by foreign companies (Deininger and Byerlee 2011). Almost half of these land-deals, which are frequently 
labelled “land-grabbing”, have taken place in Africa, followed by Southeast Asia (especially Indonesia and the Philippines) (Rulli, 
Saviori, and D’Odorico 2013). A number of negative consequence of foreign land ownership in terms of human rights and 
environmental impacts have been documented in recent studies (UNECA 2016). Yet, it has also been argued that activist 
rhetoric of illegality, large-scale acquisitions, and the displacement of local people focuses on a few isolated instances and fails 
to take into account the broad spectrum of land deals (Hall 2011).  
For levying land taxes, it should in principle not make a difference whether domestic or foreign owners hold agricultural land. 
For instance, taxes on profits or value added are commonly imposed on companies regardless of their country of origin. It can 
be argued that foreign companies may be able to use the land more efficiently – e.g. due to better access to capital and 
technology, economies of scale, or integration of supply chains. In this case, these companies would derive a higher value from 
using agricultural land – and hence would offer a better prospect of taxation. However, foreign investment might be protected 
by “certain standards of treatment that can be enforced via binding investor-to-state dispute settlement outside the domestic 
juridical system”, aiming to reduce investors’ risks by restricting the recipient country’s sovereignty (Neumayer and Spess 
2005). Provisions requiring states to provide “fair and equitable treatment” are frequently interpreted as protecting investors’ 
“legitimate expectations” with regard to policy change (Cotula and Berger 2015). This is likely to be particularly salient if the 
investor has paid a sales price that can be regarded as “fair” by reflecting the (discounted) flow of future land rents. As his 
revenues still exceed the marginal costs of doing business, an investor will continue to operate. However, as long as the 
revenues are not used in a compensatory fashion (e.g. by improving infrastructure of lowering other taxes; see also the 
discussion in Section 2.4) he has lost out on the initial investment, which does not reflect the revenues received after the land 
tax reform. In addition, the prospect of this kind of surprise policy change could scare off potential future investors. 
The above considerations might restrict a government’s ability or willingness to introduce (or raise already existing) land taxes. 
Currently, almost two-thirds of land deals were subject to some form of investment treatment, but there is considerable 
variation of coverage across countries, ranging from 0 percent in Brazil to 100 percent in Vietnam (Cotula and Berger 2015). 
Ensuring that land taxation is compatible with these deals will be an essential prerequisite for countries aiming to embark on 
fiscal reform. 
2.6. Major experiences with land taxes in low-income 
countries 
More than 30 countries, including developing countries, use or have used some sort of land tax (Dye and 
England 2010; Richard Miller Bird and Slack 2004; William J McCluskey and Franzsen 2005; Fernandez 
Milan, Kapfer, and Creutzig 2016). However, countries define the tax differently, i.e. how the tax base is 
defined, to whom it may apply or how the appraisal is undertaken. For example, land taxes may apply to 
all land uses, agricultural land or developed land, and exclude other types of land use (i.e. public land). 
Figure 4 illustrates the land value taxation experiences including the definition of the tax base and the 
assessment method for various countries. 
Land taxes proliferated in young, developing colonies (or ex-colonies) from middle and low income 
countries as capital improved value systems were perceived to penalize development (McCluskey and 
Franzsen 2005). They have also been attractive in places where a system of registration of title or deeds 
was already in place at the time, at least within the areas where property taxes were introduced (i.e. Fiji, 
Kenya, and South Africa), and where there is no major issue regarding tenure insecurity and boundary 
disputes. For example, local governments in South Africa have relied upon taxation of urban land values 
as a significant revenue source for almost a century until early the 2000s, when a law eliminated the 
local option of a split-rate tax in favor of a single-rate property tax (Andelson 2001).  
Although there is no unique approach among world regions on how governments appraise land values, 
agricultural land is typically assessed using an area-based approach (Khan 2001). When the tax applies 
to all land uses, including developed land, market or cadastral values are preferred. Governments tend to 
implement relief mechanisms to ensure that farmers are not taxed too heavily. They use deferrals of 
non-agriculture related values (New Zealand), differential and preferential rates (Australia, Fiji and South 
Africa respectively), limiting taxable values to current use (Australia), rebates (Jamaica), or simply exclude 
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rural land (Kenya and Fiji). In places where development is coupled with rapid urbanization, governments 
tend to shift towards property taxes to avoid land value appraisal processes (Jamaica, Kenya). In Fiji, 
however, local authorities have focused on enhancing the assessment process instead of changing the 
tax base (William J McCluskey and Franzsen 2005).  
There is a trend towards implementing differential taxation according to land values and land uses9 
(South Africa, Fiji, Kenya, among others), penalizing unimproved land in particular to curb land 
speculation (i.e. Hungary, Tunisia). Tax rates in middle and high income countries are typically adjusted 
annually to avoid the gradual erosion of the tax base (as has happened in the case of Jamaica) (William J 
McCluskey and Franzsen 2005). Classified assessment systems are another common and cost-effective 
way of differentiating among property classes (i.e. the Philippines). Under this system, a uniform tax rate 
is applied and properties are differentiated through assessment value ratios (the percentage of assessed 
value that is accepted as tax base) (Richard Miller Bird and Slack 2004; Fernandez Milan, Kapfer, and 
Creutzig 2016). 
Land as well as property taxes are often important sources of local revenue, and thus have historically 
been locally governed (with a few exceptions like Ethiopia, Jamaica and Chile, where national 
governments regulate and administrate the tax). Their contribution to local revenues is highest in high-
income countries, followed by Latin America, and some African countries, and lowest in Asian countries 
(Richard Miller Bird and Slack 2004). However, there is little evidence on the specific role of pure land 
taxes – in contrast to property taxes – for middle and low-income countries. Revenues are typically 
reported together with other local taxes in place (Richard Miller Bird and Slack 2004). In Europe, revenue 
raised exclusively from land taxes is highest in Denmark, Slovenia and Estonia with around 1 percent of 
GDP and 2.5 percent of total tax revenues (Fernandez Milan, Kapfer, and Creutzig 2016). Overall, the 
experience with land taxes is very broad (see Fig. 4) and interaction effects have to be discussed at the 
national level.  
  
                                                             
9 Commercial and industrial owners typically do not vote in that jurisdiction and governments feel free to impose higher tax 
rates on them (William J McCluskey and Franzsen 2005; Dye and England 2010). 
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Figure 4 Land taxation experience 
 
Note: based on (Dye and England 2010; Richard Miller Bird and Slack 2004; William J McCluskey and Franzsen 2005; Fernandez Milan, Kapfer, 
and Creutzig 2016; Khan 2001). Countries have only a land-based tax (“Land”); others have a complementary property tax (“property tax”), or 
there is no available information whether additional taxes on property exist (“land; -“). For country-based information see Table 6 in the Appendix). 
2.7. Synthesis: How land taxes can contribute to sustainable 
development 
The previous elaborations on the various effects of land taxes on economic growth, land use and 
inequality are summarized in Figure 5. Various co-benefits of formal land tenure with a centralized land 
registry are related to sustainable land use and deforestation, rural development as well as social 
inclusion (Section 2.5.1). Land taxes, if differentiated among land type, can directly affect incentives for 
land use and help put land to its most productive use (Section 2.3). Taxes designed to absorb part of the 
land rent are a non-distorting way of financing government expenditures. As a result, other taxes that 
impede growth or have adverse environmental or food production effects, such as agricultural taxes, can 
be reduced (see Malan 2015 for Africa). Alternatively, investments in infrastructure, health or social 
security can be increased – domains where additional investments have large social returns for 
developing countries and facilitate the achievements of the SDGs. Increased infrastructure contributes to 
growth (Esfahani and Ramı́rez 2003; Mattauch et al. 2013) but may also induce further intensification 
as well as extensification. Using higher revenues for infrastructure investments can contribute to more 
productive land-use (Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom 1997; Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa 2006; 
Headey, Alauddin, and Rao 2010). An empirical analysis by Neumann et al. (2010) on global yield gaps 
found that limited access to markets and irrigation explains a large share of the yield gap in developing 
countries. In contrast, a spatial data analysis in Brazil emphasizes the role of infrastructure and access to 
remote areas in increased deforestation (Pfaff 1999). Finally, land taxes directly reduce household 
incomes and indirectly affect incomes in the way that revenues are recycled through the fiscal system or 
other tax reductions. 
While the case for efficient revenue raising is strong and supported by the literature, weaker evidence 
exists on the potential to change land use dynamics. Existing model calculations by equilibrium models 
on land tax shifts confirm that land taxation increases efficiency (decreases MCF); models with 
endogenous land supply also indicate land-sparing effects while distributional effects are often very 
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heterogeneous (see Table 7  in the Appendix for details). The impact on inequality is a priori unclear and 
has hardly been analyzed thus far. 
Figure 5. Land taxes and sustainable development – synthesis  
  
Source. Own elaboration based previous subsections. 
3. Country Typology  
We develop a simple typology to identify countries that perform well among some of the key aspects of 
sustainable development outlined in Section 2.7 and where institutional requirements for land tax 
reforms are supportive. We group out indicators into aspects of land taxation that (i) tend to increase 
social welfare (‘benefits’) and (ii) are related to the feasibility of land taxation. As we rely on cross-
country data for 83 middle and low-income countries where all world regions are represented, only a 
limited set of indicators is considered. A detailed and technical description of the indicators and data 
sources is given in Appendix Section 7.4. 
3.1. Data on typology indicators 
Here we outline the major characteristics of indicators and sources. With respect to environment-related 
indicators, we use (1) deforestation rates10 as one indication of the environmental effects of reduced 
land demand in a country and (2) cereal yields as an indication of the level of land use efficiency.11 Both 
indicators are readily accessible and provide a rough indication of extensification pressure and 
intensification potential, respectively. Within the economic dimension of land taxes, we cover the 
revenue raising potential of land taxes, the need for additional public funds and the distortions of the 
existing fiscal system: we use (3) agricultural land rents (as a percentage of GDP) (World Bank 2011b) as 
                                                             
10 Deforestation rate refers to % change of forest area between 2005 and 2015, using data from FAO (2016a) 
11 cereal yields are calculated in kcal/ha, based on data from FAOSTAT 
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an indicator for the maximum amount of revenues that can be obtained by (agricultural) land rent 
taxation.12 In countries with low land rents, the introduction of land rents will consequently generate low 
revenues. We consider (4) financial needs for development-related infrastructure investments.13 High 
financial needs indicate large social returns of public investments which need to be compared with the 
efficiency and administration costs of the fiscal system to raise revenues. We proxy the efficiency of the 
fiscal system by looking at (5) taxes on trade14 that are usually more distortionary than taxes on 
consumption and land (see section 2.2).15 Finally, a land tax also affects wealth and income distribution 
and therefore poverty levels. If land taxes are primarily paid by the rural poor, this may increase poverty 
and inequality. As a proxy for the land tax burden on the poor, we consider (6) the shares of small sized 
agricultural holdings with area size less than 2 hectares (FAO 2014). If most of the agricultural holdings 
are small, a land tax will apply predominantly to subsistence farmers who typically have very low 
incomes.  
The welfare-related indicators are complemented by two feasibility indicators which address 
institutional barriers for implementing a land tax reform: (a) the quality of land administration index16 
and (b) the control of corruption index.17 Land tax reforms should be easier to implement in countries 
with high quality of land administration services. Compliance and revenues created are also higher for 
countries with high quality of land administration and low levels of corruption. 
3.2. Selection of Pareto frontier countries 
We group the mentioned indicators into a “benefit” category (for the six indicators related to direct 
effects of land taxes on social welfare) and a “feasibility” category. For selecting case study countries, we 
are interested in cases with high potential and high feasibility, as these would be countries where land 
tax reforms will have a high chance success. Because our feasibility indicators (and also some benefit 
indicators) are non-monetary, there is no clear way of aggregating them. Rather, we plot countries in the 
benefit-feasibility space (varying by indicator) and choose the Pareto-frontier of countries.18 Hence, a 
country lies in the Pareto frontier if there is no other country with higher benefits and feasibility.  
Clearly, a country at the Pareto frontier provides a more interesting case for deeper analysis than a 
country behind the frontier. Nevertheless, the identification of the Pareto frontier is also subject to 
measurement error and imperfections in the underlying data. To relax the strict Pareto criterion, we 
include additional (higher-order) Pareto frontiers, i.e. the subsequent Pareto frontiers that lie behind the 
first frontier.19 Considering the first three Pareto frontiers allows for a selection procedure for case study 
                                                             
12 We use agricultural rents as data on urban land rents are not available. 
13 Financial needs are expressed as required infrastructure costs (% GDP) that would enable universal access to five types of 
infrastructure which are also considered in the Sustainable Development Goals: water, sanitation, electricity, roads, and 
information and communication technology (ICT) (Jakob et al. 2016). 
14 These are calculated as the sum of customs and other import duties and taxes on exports (expressed as % of GDP). 
15 Ideally, we would use MCFs as indicators for the efficiency of the tax system. There is no comprehensive and consistent 
dataset on MCFs estimates. Taxes on capital and labor might also serve as indicator for the efficiency of the tax system but data 
is available only for a limited number of countries.  
16 The land administration index is the sum of the scores on four sub-indices: reliability of infrastructure, transparency of 
information, geographic coverage and land dispute resolution indices. We normalized the index to values between 0 and 1, with 
higher values indicating better quality of the land administration system. (World Bank Group 2016) 
17 The control of corruption index is part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (World Bank 2016b); it reflects 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests (Kauffmann and Kraay 2016). 
18 Formally, the Pareto frontier is defined by ݅ ∈ ܲଵ  ↔ for all ݆ ∈ ܰ, ݆ ≠ ݅: ௝ܾ > ܾ௜  and ௝݂ > ௜݂  with i,j indicating countries 
(total N), and ௝ܾ  benefits and ௝݂  feasibility of the respective country.  
19 Formally, we call ܲଵ also the first-order Pareto frontier and we define the m-order Pareto frontier recursively as the Pareto 
frontier of the set of countries without the m-1, m-2, … 1 order Pareto frontier: ݅ ∈ ܲ௠  ↔ for all ݆ ∈ ܰ\(ܲଵ ∪ ܲଶ ∪ … ∪ܲ௠ିଵ), ݆ ≠ ݅: ௝ܾ > ܾ௜  and ௝݂ > ௜݂  
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candidates which is more robust and less prone to measurement errors. The typology thus allows for the 
identification of ‘low hanging fruits’, i.e. countries where land taxation is likely to have high benefits and 
apparently feasible institutional conditions for the reform to be successful.  
3.3. Results of the typology 
As an example, Figure 6 shows the Pareto frontiers results for the quality of land administration index 
and agricultural land rents. Appendix 7.5 contains the remaining results, with Figure 9 including all other 
Pareto frontiers and Table 10 listing the countries according to =world regions and the numbers of 
Pareto frontiers in descending order.  
The countries that emerge as the most promising candidates for land taxation are located in different 
world regions and income groups, which suggests that land rent taxation might be of interest for a 
broad array of countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the spending dimension is of particular relevance, 
followed by the potential to reduce distortive taxes and enhance yield production. Latin American 
countries show higher potential with regard to the environmental dimension (yield productivity and 
deforestation). Countries from Southeast Asia and the Pacific show no preferential dimension, 
performing well across all indicators. Lower middle-income countries seem to perform particularly well 
with respect to the share of small farm holders.20 
Figure 6. Typology results - Pareto frontiers for the indicators Quality of Land Administration Index and Agricultural Land 
Rents.  
 
4. Case studies 
4.1. Country selection and characteristics 
We focus on six countries for a more detailed analysis, two from each of the following regions: Sub-
Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Latin America & Caribbean. Our selection criteria are 
based on a combination of factors: the representation of different world regions, their performance in 
                                                             
20 A deeper analysis of reasons for countries’ location in the typology is beyond the scope of this paper, as we use the typology 
only as a means of identifying and highlighting countries with specific characteristics.  
Lithuania 
Malaysia 
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the typology, the availability of up to date household data, and the motivation to select non-neighboring 
countries within each region in an attempt to be as representative as possible.21 We review the existing 
tax system with respect to land and property taxes and explore the potential for enhanced land rent 
taxation including its distributional effects. For quantifying revenue and distributional effects, we also 
include quantitative micro-simulations based on nationally representative household data. 
We select Rwanda, Ghana, Indonesia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Peru, which allows us to capture a large 
variety of countries with differing welfare and feasibility aspects. Table 2 summarizes their main 
characteristics related to our typology. Rwanda is a country with relatively good institutions (in the 
African continent) with respect to land administration and control of corruption, high agricultural rents 
and high financial needs. Ghana, the second African country in our country selection, has lower 
agricultural rents and worse institutional performance than Rwanda. Implementing land taxes might be 
more challenging in Ghana but they could be particularly beneficial if combined with reduced trade 
distortions: as the nominal rate of assistance is negative, agriculture is effectively taxed and production 
is thus discouraged. Both African countries are characterized by high population growth rates (above 2 
percent – compared to growth rates around 1.2 percent for the other countries). Hence, demand for 
housing but also for land for food production is expected to increase in all six countries with substantial 
increases in Rwanda and Ghana.  
Indonesia is a country that experiences a strong deforestation rate. Thus, high taxes on agricultural land 
(in particular land for palm oil production) could be a complementary instrument in reducing 
deforestation. As Indonesia already uses land taxes, institutional feasibility for upscaling land taxes 
should be rather high, though the land administration is plagued by bureaucratic rules, complex multi-
level governance and corruption. Because small farmers operate a large share of the agricultural land 
holdings, distributional effects are of particular interest. Most farmers in Indonesia are small-scale 
farmers. Peru has rather high fiscal needs to ensure universal access to essential infrastructure. 
Agricultural holdings are relatively large, indicating that land taxes would not affect many households 
under the extreme poverty line. With respect to agricultural land use efficiency, Rwanda, Ghana and 
Nicaragua have low cereal yields, indicating large land-saving potential. Negative rates of assistance for 
agricultural products in Ghana and Nicaragua might be one explanation for these low yields as they 
discourage investments. In contrast, yields in Peru, Indonesia and Vietnam are already high. With respect 
to inequality characteristics, the Gini index is high in African and Latin American countries; absolute 
poverty is highest in Rwanda and Ghana while the remaining four countries have poverty rates below 10 
percent. Thus, distributional effects of land taxes are particularly relevant for African countries as they 
might affect poverty rates.  
  
                                                             
21 In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, Uganda would be the next one with data availability on the Pareto frontier. 
However, due to the similarities it has with Rwanda, which was already selected, we decided not to take a neighboring country.  
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Table 2. Main characteristics of the six countries selected.  
Region Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America & Caribbean South East Asia and 
Pacific 
Economy Rwanda Ghana Peru Nicaragua Indonesia Vietnam 
Income Low income Low income Upper middle  Lower middle  Lower middle  Low income 
Population (mill.)  11.34 27.40 30.97 6.02 257.60 91.70 
Population growth 
(annual %) 
2.30 2.30 1.30 1.10 1.20 1.10 
Urban share (%) 28.81 54.04 78.61 58.78 53.74 33.60 
GDP/cap (US$) 690 1697 5934 1849 3834 1685 
Agricultural land rents 
(% of GDP)22 
29.63 10.88 4.21 11.74 5.10 10.85 
Agricultural land rents 
(% of GDP)23 
20.00 (est.) 16.38 2.65 3.79 5.34 4.87 
Financial needs (% of 
GDP)24 
266 56 64 310 44 42 
Trade tax revenues (% 
of GDP)25 
1.25 3.60 0.30 0.74 0.58 - 
Deforestation rate (% 
of total area)26 
-1.40 -0.62 0.70 0.00 1.90 -2.10 
Quality of land 
administration27 
0.86 0.20 0.55 0.14 0.21 0.43 
Control of Corruption 0.77 0.45 0.30 0.20 0.35 0.36 
Yields (Mcal/ha)28 7102 5731 11530 6218 13269 13609 
Small agricultural 
holdings29 
- - 0 21 88 95 
Poverty rate 60.43 25.19 3.13 6.22 8.25 3.06 
Gini Index 44.8 42.77 44.14 47.05 39.47 37.59 
Nominal rate of 
assistance (NRA)30 
- -0.04 - -0.12 0.20 0.11 
Land tax potential 1,2,3,4,5 3, 5 1,4 4 1, 6 4,3, 5 
Note. For land tax potential according to Pareto frontiers, included until 3rd Pareto frontier. Indices represent the indicators, where 1: 
deforestation; 2: yields; 3: agricultural land rents; 4: financial needs; 5: tax distortions; 6: share of small farm holders. Data on population, 
population growth, urban share and GDP per capita are from 2015. GDP/cap refers to constant 2010$. Poverty rates and Gini Index are from most 
recent year available. Source: (World Bank 2016a). An exception is the Gini coefficient for Rwanda, which is taken from the Rwandan Fourth 
Population and Housing Census – 2012. World Development Indicators report a Gini coefficient of 50.44.  
Table 3 emphasizes the main characteristics of the fiscal systems of those countries where we perform 
an in-depth quantitative analysis. While Peru enjoys large revenues, particularly from natural resource 
extraction and mining, the main sources of tax revenues in all countries are income and consumption 
taxes. The allocative efficiency costs of these distortionary taxes can vary substantially and can exceed 
100 percent, as in the case of Rwanda. In contrast, land and property related taxes (including taxes on 
property transactions) constitute only a minor share of government revenues. Hence, Table 3 indicates 
                                                             
22 Source: (World Bank 2011b).  
23 Land rent data taken from (H.-L. Lee et al. 2009) and GDP data from (World Bank 2016a). Rwanda is based on data from 
Uganda, as there was no data available; Nicaragua takes average per hectare land rent for Central America and multiplies it by 
2000 Nicaragua´s agricultural land surface (World Bank 2016a). 
24 Source: (Jakob et al. 2016).  
25 Sum of the share of customs and other import duties and taxes on exports as % GDP, using most recent year (between 2010 
and 2015). Source: World Bank (2016).  
26 Inverse of delta forest area (% of land area) 2005-2015. Source: FAO (2016a).  
27 Quality of land administration index normalized to 0-1 values. Source: World Bank Group (2015).  
28 Area-weighted average cereal yields in Mcal/ha per country (average for 2010-2014). Source: Kalkuhl and Mujahid (2014).  
29 Agricultural holdings <2ha as % of total agricultural holdings. Source: FAO (2014).  
30 Source: Anderson and Masters (2009).  
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that shifting the source of government revenues from distortionary taxes to land taxes can have 
substantial economic benefits by reducing deadweight losses of the existing tax system. 
Table 3 Overview on current fiscal system and the role of land and property taxes 
  Rwanda Peru Nicaragua Indonesia 
Current fiscal system  
Tax revenues (% GDP) - Total 16.04 18.92 20.37 12.17 
  Income 5.98 7.72 5.77 5.17 
  VAT 5.18 7.06 6.33 3.87 
  Trade 1.58 0.18 0.62 0.41 
  Land & property (recurrent) 0.00 0.22 0.12 0.22 
Marginal costs of public funds (MCF)31 1.23-2.4732 0.60-1.7133 NA 0.74-1.9134 
4.2. Data and methods for household analyses and 
simulations 
The quantitative results presented here are based on the analysis of data from nationally representative 
household surveys that include information on income, expenditures, land ownership and property 
ownership (see Appendix Table 13). For calculating the size of land rents, we distinguish agricultural 
land, housing land (property) and other land (typically business property), depending on availability in 
the household survey. For agricultural land, we use the rent flow from renting out land that households 
own as rent value. If households use land that they own, they are typically asked about the value of 
selling that plot of land (or buying an equivalent plot of land). We calculate the implicit rent flow from 
cultivating land that households own with a country-specific price-to-rent ratio. For housing property 
and other property we proceed equivalently. There are often mixed or traditional tenure regimes where 
households hold land or property without considering themselves to be the (formal) owner. We consider 
these households generally as (economic) owners of the land rent if they do not pay a rent for using the 
land or property because they benefit from using the land without paying for it.  
Whereas agricultural land has almost all value coming from the pure land rent, the value of housing 
property depends also on the structures in place. In order to infer the pure land rents of housing 
properties (to which a pure land tax would apply), we estimate a household-specific land to property 
ratio. The ratio is based on a regression analysis where we estimate the property rent variation according 
to two groups of indicators: a) structure-based factors, such as type of construction materials and 
property size, and b) land-based factors, such as accessibility to basic public infrastructure (transport, 
water, schools, etc.) and distances to these public facilities and regional dummies (see Annex 7.8 for 
more details). While the former influence the value of the structure, the latter determine the value of the 
land without structure. The land to property ratio is then estimated from the predicted land and 
structure value from the regression.  
In order to analyze distributional implications of land taxes, we group households into five income 
quintiles depending on their adult-equivalent per-capita expenditure.35 We use aggregate expenditure 
                                                             
31 As MCF are calculated for individual taxes, we show a range over all considered taxes with income taxes typically on the upper 
range. Negative MCFs indicate welfare gains that can arise if a tax reduces other market imperfections or distortions. 
32 Source: Auriol and Warlters (2012).  
33 Source: Cordano and Balistreri (2010).  
34 Source: Devamjan et al. (2002).  
35 We calculate income on a per-capita base for calculating the income quintiles (as otherwise small HHs would be considered 
more likely to be in a lower income quintile). For calculating income per capita, we correct for the fact that children cost less 
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data as they provide a more reliable proxy for the permanent net income of households (Friedman 
1957; Slesnick 1993), except for Peru where aggregated income data was available. In the following, we 
use the term income synonymously with permanent income or expenditure. 
Our first aim is to calculate land rents and their distribution among the population (see Table 4 below 
and Figure 12 and Figure 13 in the Appendix). We first estimate the average land ownership and then 
the median rent income share of land owning households for different income quintiles. We use the 
median rent income share, as this is less sensitive to outliers that are particularly driven by households 
with very low incomes which inflate land income shares. We further upscale households’ land rents to 
the national sum using the survey weights from the sampling design, which gives us an estimate of the 
national annual land rents for different land uses.  
Figure 7 Policy simulations: non-linear tax schemes 
 
 
The second aim of the quantitative analysis is to estimate the revenues of a land value tax (Table 5) as 
well as the distributional effects among households relative to their income (Figure 8), assuming that 
land owners will carry the entire burden of the land tax. We analyze two different designs of land taxes. 
The first one is a linear tax where all rents are taxed at a constant rate. We choose 25 percent and 50 
percent to illustrate revenue and distributional effects. With a price-to-rent ratio of 20, a land rent tax of 
20 percent corresponds to a tax on land value of one percent. As property taxes typically range between 
0.1 and 2 percent of the property value (see De Cesare (2010) for Latin America), the 25 percent rent 
tax corresponds to a rather typical property tax rate. As moving from property taxation to land taxation 
reduces the tax base because the value of structure is not taxed, our 50 percent land rent tax can be 
considered as a land rent tax that generates revenues similar to those of a typical property tax. Due to 
the linear nature of the assumed taxation scheme, revenues and distributional effects for different tax 
rates can be deduced in a straightforward manner by scaling. The second tax design we consider is a 
non-linear land tax that assumes a “tax-free” amount based on the median total rent of landowners in 
the poorest quintile (including agriculture and housing for all countries except Peru). Above that tax-free 
amount, the linear tax applies (see Figure 7). This non-linear tax scheme is considered as it may a) reduce 
the administrative costs and b) enhance the progressivity of the tax design. The results are shown in 
Table 4 and Figure 8.36  
We report land rents (as well as revenues from land taxes) relative to GDP and relative to household 
income. The nationally up-scaled household data gives substantially lower aggregate household incomes 
than national GDP numbers (up to 50%). This might be due to various reasons: (i) wealthier households 
might be under-represented, (ii) consumption or income data might be biased downwards, (iii) 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
than adults. Based on (Deaton 2003) we consider children (0-14 years) to be equivalent to 0.3 adults in Rwanda, Ghana and 
Nicaragua and 0.5 adults in Indonesia.  
36 We also consider a “tax-free” amount based on land types (housing and agricultural land when available) and location (urban and rural), based on the hypothesis that the distribution will become more progressive, but this is not the case as agricultural median values are more homogeneous for different quintiles, thus the results are reported only in the Appendix (see Appendix 7.8.4). 
Tax burden 
Land rent income 
25% tax 
50% tax 
Tax-free amount = median rent income of the poorest 20% 
25% tax 
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expenditure on some items or income has not fully been reported and (iv) income and land ownership 
from foreigners, large national or multinational companies or from the state are not recorded in the 
household data. All of these issues would likely imply downward-biased land rents. Measurement errors 
and underreporting of income, expenditure and assets are a common problem in household surveys 
(Moore and Welniak 2000). While information from household data is affected by measurement error, it 
is often the only source of information on land rents and on the income distribution. Aggregate 
estimates for agricultural land rents allow for cross-checks but are also subject to methodological 
criticism. Hence, the insights from the household data analysis should be understood as an effort to 
expand the available knowledge and data on land values and their distribution.  
4.3. Case study results 
4.3.1.  Overview on quantitative results 
The quantitative household analysis will provide information on the size and distribution of land rents, as 
well as the revenue and distributional effects of land rent taxation. As Table 4 and Figure 11 (Appendix) 
indicate, land ownership is widespread and rather homogenous: except for Nicaragua, more than 90% 
of households in the lowest income group are landowners, mostly as they own the house they live in. In 
contrast, high-income households tend to be less likely to be landowners: they  frequently live in cities in 
rented apartments and they do not own agricultural land as often, since they do not work as farmers. 
Hence, land rent taxation will affect a large share of the population and therefore enjoy a broad tax base. 
Our decomposition of property value into a land value and a structure value reveals that land values 
constitute on average 40 to 50 percent of the property value (see Table 15 in Appendix), indicating that 
roughly half of the property value consists of the land rent. This is consistent with other estimates of 
land value share on housing values (Knoll, Schularick, and Steger 2017). The subsequent calculations for 
urban land rents refer therefore to the pure land rent component of property. As expected, agricultural 
rents are more relevant for the rural population and constitute 2-7% of household income. Median 
housing rents constitute 3-7% of income and total land rents range from 8-12% of household income 
(Table 4).  
As discussed in the methodology section, rents measured as % of GDP are far lower than those 
measured as a percentage of household income due to biased or incomplete reporting of expenditure, 
income and land ownership data. For agricultural rents, we can compare our micro-estimates directly 
with macro-estimates from other sources, particularly from the World Bank and the SAGE database 
which are based on revenues and costs from cultivating agricultural land, see Table 2. We find again that 
agricultural rents calculated from the household data are below the macro-estimates. The figures from 
the household data provide an independent estimate of land rents. They also emphasize that estimates 
of land rents – based on one methodology or another – should be treated with some caution.  
A particular reporting problem arises for total agricultural land in Indonesia and Rwanda. For the former, 
the total land households own (17.2 mln ha) is far lower than the total non-forest crop land that 
Indonesian Agricultural Ministry reports (39.3 mln ha)37 or the agricultural area (including meadows and 
pastures but not forests) that FAOSTAT reports (57 mln ha). One source of under-reporting can be that 
large-scale commercial palm oil plantation owners are not well represented in the household survey. 
Large-scale commercial palm oil plantations cover almost 4 mln ha of land from which 2 mln ha is 
owned by foreign companies.38 If the agricultural area is indeed 57 mln ha and the land value of the 
non-reported land similar to the land reported in our survey, total agricultural rents may indeed be more 
                                                             
37 See Secretariat General – Ministry of Agriculture 2014: Statistics of Agricultural Land 2009-2013. 
38 Figures refer to 2011, see http://www.datacon.co.id/Sawit-2011ProfilIndustri.html  
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than three times the value indicated from the household survey, i.e. 3% of GDP or 7% of household 
income. A similar discrepancy is visible in Rwanda, where the total land owned by households reported in 
the household survey (0.9 mln ha) represents only 50 % of the agricultural area from FAOSTAT data 
(1.8 mln ha). Hence, true land rents will likely be higher than those we estimate with the household data. 
If the missing land rents accrue to domestic or foreign companies, they might be subject to taxation as 
households are; in contrast, state-owned land will not provide any additional tax revenues for the 
government. 
With respect to the distribution of land rents, low-income households tend to have larger rent income 
shares, which can be substantial for the poorest households. These can reach up to 17% of income, as in 
the case of Rwanda. Hence, land rent taxation might be regressive as it disproportionately affects poor 
households. Where data is available (Rwanda), we further find that only a minor share of households 
actually pays property taxes. These revenues constitute a negligible amount of government revenues. 
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Table 4. Household survey data – analysis of land rents 
 Rwanda39 Peru40 Nicaragua  Indonesia41 
Agricultural land rents (% GDP) 3.91 - 4.70 0.97 
  (% Household income)  6.72 - 7.27 2.39 
Housing land rents (% GDP) 1.48 0.98 2.78 2.11 
  (% Household income) 2.54 1.96 4.30 5.19 
Total land rent (% GDP)42 5.39 - 7.48 3.42 
  (% Household income) 9.27 - 11.57 8.41 
Land ownership (% of HH)     
 Poorest quintile 95.31 96.97 75.41 96.46 
 Middle quintile 93.50 90.34 73.34 93.46 
 Wealthiest quintile 69.92 87.10 76.24 85.61 
Median rent income share of land-owning HHs (%) (Housing)   
 Poorest quintile 16.77 3.64 9.21 9.96 
 Middle quintile 13.95 2.30 6.28 5.81 
 Wealthiest quintile 7.82 1.72 5.31 3.44 
Median annual land rent in poorest quintile43 (Housing)    
 Local currency  RWF 42.407 S/ 330 NIO 5,410  IDR 1,606,229 
US$ (adjusted to 2014 PPP conversion factor) 160 201 510 350 
Property tax revenue (% of GDP) current system 0.12 - 0.05 - 
Property tax payers (as a percentage of HH) 
current system 
7.73 - 15.71 - 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
With respect to the policy simulations, our analysis reveals that a 25 percent linear tax creates revenues 
of around 1 percent of GDP. Although these numbers seem to be small, they may constitute a 
substantial share of the current government revenues. Levying a tax of 50% on land rents would be 
sufficient to cover more that 14 percent of the current government budget for Rwanda, Indonesia and 
Nicaragua. For Peru, only data on housing rents are available; applying a tax of 50% on these rents 
would only amount to about 3% of the government budget and hence would not make a significant 
contribution to the consolidation of public finance. Figure 8 shows the tax burden for each household as 
a percentage of total income (only considering households who are landowners). Even though rents are 
on average higher in wealthier households, housing land ownership and average rents as a percentage 
of income are higher for lower income households (see also Figures in Appendix 8.8). This means that 
linear taxation schemes, such as the ones shown for tax rates of 25 percent (blue) and 50 percent (red), 
have regressive impacts on the distribution of income. For instance, in Rwanda, the 50 percent land rent 
tax would amount to about 6 percent of available household income for the poorest quintile, but less 
than 3 percent for the richest. 
One approach to avoid regressive outcomes would be a nonlinear system with a “free tax” amount 
applicable to all households based on the median total land rent of the poorest income quintile (see 
Table 4). Above that amount, tax rates of 25 percent (green) and 50 percent (orange) are applied on 
land rents. Figure 8 illustrates that from a purely revenue raising point of view a linear system is most 
advantageous, while the nonlinear system is preferable for distributional reasons as it shows a mostly 
progressive incidence. Hence, avoiding regressivity can be achieved by accepting revenues that are 
                                                             
39 Main figures: Tax revenues (as % GDP) for 2015, source: (World Bank 2016a). Income, VAT, Trade, Land and Property figures 
from 2009, source: (US AID 2011).  
40 Data only available for housing for all analysis but ownership where agricultural land is also reported.  
41 Main figures source: data for Indonesia for 2005-2008 (average) from Table 1 in Amir et al. (2013).  
42 Indonesia reports also for „other land rents”, which include for example, business land, and represent 0.33 and 0.82 % of GDP 
and of Household income respectively.  
43 Only landowners included (renters excluded). PPP conversion factors for private consumption (LCU per international $), 2014 
Source: World Bank (2016a).  
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between 26 percent and 38 percent lower than they would be under linear taxation (Table 5). Under the 
non-linear tax scheme, the average effective tax rate falls substantially because of the tax free amount: 
Even for the 50 percent non-linear tax scheme, effective tax rates range from 30 to 39 percent 
suggesting a more moderate tax burden. Policymakers thus need to appropriately balance the trade-off 
between maximizing revenues and ensuring equitable distributional outcomes. Table 5 also shows that 
under a nonlinear tax, depending on the country, the number of taxpayers would be reduced by between 
30 percent and 46 percent, which would decrease administrative costs.  
Finally, in Rwanda we can also compare the proposed systems with that currently existing system 
(green-grey in Figure 8). Property taxes in Rwanda perform worse in both revenue raising and 
progressivity compared to the proposed tax systems. Interestingly, in Rwanda, both simulated non-linear 
tax schemes will lead to larger tax liabilities for richer households but not for the poorest ones, in 
comparison to the current tax regime. 
  
Table 5 Main revenue implications of land taxes  
Note: Tax-free amounts are based on the median annual total land rent in poorest quintile (see Table 4). In the Appendix 8.1 further results are 
shown; outcomes of policy simulations are calculated using tax-free amounts based on land types and location (urban and rural) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rwanda Peru 
(housing 
only) 
Nicaragua Indonesia 
A. Linear tax scheme 
Nº tax paying households  2,219,040 7,741,249 1,069,663 64,082,198 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) at 25% tax rate 1.35 0.25 1.87 0.86 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) at 50% tax rate 2.69 0.49 3.74 1.71 
Government budget increase (%) at 25% tax rate 8.40 1.30 9.17 7,03 
Government budget increase (%) at 50% tax rate 16.76 2.58 18.35 14,06 
B. Non-linear tax scheme 
Taxpayers drop out (nonlinear vs. linear) (%) 35.36 30.06 33.43 45,97 
Total revenue reduction (nonlinear vs. linear) (%) 27.10 39.79 22.20 28.76 
Average tax rate of non-linear 25% tax (%) 18.21 15.08 19.43 17.81 
Average tax rate of non-linear 50% tax (%) 36.43 30.23 38.86 35.62 
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Figure 8. Distributional implications of different land tax systems over expenditure quintiles.  
 
a)      b)                                        
 
 c)                                                           d)                                        
Note: Tax paid by each household as a percentage of total income over the income quintiles (x-axis) for a 25 percent and 50 percent tax rate for 
the linear and the nonlinear system for a) Rwanda b) Peru c) Nicaragua and d) Indonesia (median). Only households owning land are considered. 
Quintile 1 are the poorest households and quintile 5 the richest ones. Non-linear taxes consider a “tax-free amount” equal to the median land rent 
of the lowest income quintile – see Table 4. In the case of Rwanda, expenditures on current actual land taxes are also included. 
In the following, we review the existing fiscal systems for property and land taxes for the case study 
countries and discuss relevant reform options, with reference to our quantitative analysis. A detailed 
overview of key characteristics of the existing tax systems is given in Appendix 0. 
4.3.2.  Rwanda 
Rwanda is a country located within Central and Eastern Africa with a population of approximately 11.3 
million people. The country has maintained an average real gross domestic product (GDP) economic 
growth rate of 8 percent over the period 2010 to 2013 and 7 percent since then, with a stable inflation 
and exchange rate (PwC, 2015). 
Main characteristics of current land tenure and land tax regime 
Most Rwandans live in single family houses, where each family owns a plot of land. However, there are 
new trends, particularly in urban areas, where the urban population tends to live in high-rise 
condominiums and informal settlements where a person owns a land parcel but several housing units 
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are built on that parcel on leasehold bases. The real estate market shows increasing dynamics nation-
wide, with 75,000 real estate transactions in 2014. These transactions represent, however, less than 1 
percent of total urban and agricultural properties (Kopanyi 2015).  
Land ownership and property taxes are primarily regulated by laws from 2002 and 2005. The 
government has been working on a new law since 2014 (Rwanda Revenue Authority 2016). All land in 
Rwanda belongs to the state, the districts and the cities, which then lease out the land to individuals or 
companies for a period of 99 years (Fortune of Africa 2016; Republic of Rwanda 2016). Following a 
decentralization approach, the collection and administration of property taxes has been vested in local 
authorities (Provinces and Districts) (Kopanyi 2015). As of today, there are two property taxes: the Land 
Lease Fees (LLF) and the Fixed Asset Tax (FAT) (Rwanda Revenue Authority 2016; Kopanyi 2015). The 
LLF is a land unit tax that varies typically between RWF 70, 30, 5 or zero per square meter with no 
charge for improvements. The tax includes parcels regardless of whether they are registered or not. In 
rural areas, the district or town council determines the tax and large land holdings are taxes at higher 
marginal rates. The FAT is levied only on registered personal properties and includes the value of land, 
building, and improvement and is charged with a tax rate of 0.1 percent of market value. Differential 
taxation may apply according to the location, type and use of building according to local regulations. 
There is also a capital gains tax, in which the gains of selling immovable commercial property are taxed 
at 30 percent (PwC 2015). Finally, there is a transfer tax of about 5.6 percent of property value (World 
Bank Group 2015).  
Discussion of land tax reform options  
Major problems related to the current property and land tax system are the narrow tax base44, low tax 
rates45, low collection efficiency46 and adverse incentives to register land because of registration fees 
and higher taxes under the FAT. The government initiated a “Fiscal Decentralization Project” in early 
2014 to increase local revenues (Kopanyi 2015). The reform aims at broadening the tax base; increasing 
tax rates; centralized collection of local taxes by the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA); and establishing 
a cost-efficient tax administration with computerized databases and state of the art filing and collection 
instruments. The draft law reflects a major policy shift by declaring all fixed assets as subject of taxation, 
regardless of legal status –whether personal ownership has been registered or not. Although the market 
value is the general tax base, two forms of taxes are defined: a) property value-based FAT (hereafter 
VFAT) and b) land area-based FAT (hereafter AFAT) which is linked to market value indirectly47. The 
valuation method will consist of the single-property valuation of market value of fixed assets by the 
owners and self-filing.  
Although the government has followed key recommendations from international experts (Grote, 
McCluskey, and McPherson 2014) there are still areas that need further refinement and analysis. For 
example, the IMF strongly suggested a single land-value option compared to the current VFAT based on 
Rwandan circumstances (the valuation approach is complex, difficult to administer, lacks oversight and 
quality control and is expensive) (Grote, McCluskey, and McPherson 2014) (Kopanyi 2015). 
Nevertheless, with the introduction of the parallel VFAT and AFAT taxation, area-based taxation will 
remain the dominant form of taxation in Rwanda, hence this could be easily shifted towards a land-value 
tax, as suggested by the IMF. Lastly, current self-assessment has been considered problematic as owners 
                                                             
44 Only 3% properties are subject to FAT (Grote, McCluskey, and McPherson 2014) 
45 FAT rate is 0.1%, a tenth of the mean international rates.  
46 The percent is unknown due to lack of solid data, but anecdotal evidences suggest no more than 30% (Kopanyi 2015) 
47 Article 10.2: a) “0.2% of the market value of immovable property equal or greater than forty million [40,000,000] Rwandan 
francs” (Article 10. 1); b) “Immovable property with market value less than forty million [40,000,000], Rwandan francs shall pay 
tax basing the fixed rate per square meter as determined by the district council basing on the market value of land and its 
location”. The definition of the b) tax rate is implicitly done through calibration by Councils (Kopanyi 2015). 
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have an incentive to under-report land holdings. Hence, including modern techniques of land valuation 
can help stabilize the tax base and ensure fair treatment.  
Our micro-simulation also reveals that the current property tax system raises less than 0.2 percent of 
GDP in property taxes, whereas a comprehensive tax on land rents at 25 percent would increase 
revenues by a factor of 10 (to 1.35 percent of GDP). Thus, extending land taxation would increase 
government revenues substantially – by 8 to 17 percent (Table 5) which allows for upscaling 
infrastructure investment in rapidly urbanizing areas but also for reducing income or trade related taxes. 
Local authorities could also gain higher financial autonomy as revenues from local taxes are in the range 
of 10-15 percent of total district revenues (Irwin, Fisher, and Pigey 2014), which is below their potential 
(Cyan, Karuranga, and Vaillancourt 2013). Co-benefits of the envisaged land tax reform relate to 
improvements in institutional quality by increased land tenure security and transparency by full 
registration of property. Nevertheless, introducing a uniform land tax would hit poorer households more 
than wealthier ones (Figure 5) and as a direct consequence increase poverty rates. Using a tax-free 
amount turns the land tax from a regressive tax to a progressive one. Under the 50 percent non-linear 
tax rate, households among all income groups do not pay more than 2 percent of their income in terms 
of land taxes. As the number of households decreases more than the revenues due to the tax exemption, 
there are additional reductions in relative administrative costs. While total tax revenues also decrease, 
higher marginal tax rates can compensate this and reduce the revenue-equity trade-off. 
4.3.3.  Ghana 
Main characteristics of current land tenure and land tax regime 
Land is held predominantly by customary authorities, such as skins, clans and families. Together they 
own about 78 percent of all land, while the state owns 20 percent (Larbi 2008). Historic dynamics 
explain the situation. After independence in 1957, the president was empowered to solely acquire land, 
essentially via eminent domain, to be managed by the Lands Commission for the public good, e.g. for the 
provision of roads, schools, and hospitals. The results have been criticized in that communities were 
unduly disposed and received inadequate refunds for purposes that often benefited the well-connected, 
which sometimes resulted in social unrest (Kasanga, Kotey, and others 2001; Larbi 2008).  
Land titles have been awarded since 1986. However, land titles were awarded non-specifically, e.g. by 
name of the clan, but not by name of those who have access to the land, which created opportunities for 
fraud. Customary land has been increasingly changing to individual land titles, in many cases changing 
secured access for communities to insecure lease-tenure (Kasanga, Kotey, and others 2001). 
Landlessness is emerging particularly in the process of urbanization at the urban fringe, where previous 
agricultural customary landholders are excluded from the process of land conversion (Kasanga, Kotey, 
and others 2001). Such results emerge from the dissolution of the trusteeship principle: customary law 
managers fail to act as fiduciaries to their community, and instead, act as private landlords. In the high 
forest zone, sharecropping and lease-holding schemes have been associated with short-rotation farming 
and deforestation. Hence, increased tenure security can have significant environmental effects at is 
allows tenants to capture the benefits from ecosystem services due to their own investments in soil and 
tree planting (Damnyag et al. 2012).  
Currently, there is no land rent taxation. However, there are different forms of property taxes in Ghana: 
property rates, ground rates and the actual property tax. Property rates and ground rates are annually 
paid on both residential and commercial real estate. While the former are paid to local governments, 
ground rates are paid to the central authority). Additionally, the property tax is an annual tax charged on 
all immovable property, including land (International Property Tax Institute 2016). It is administered by 
the local authority, which is also in charge of assessing property values and defining tax rates within a 
range between 0.5 percent to 3 percent (Global Property Guide 2016). Recently, however, rates in some 
     29 
 
 
 
 
parts of Accra have increased up to 3 percent of the property value. Hence, the property tax bill depends 
as much on the location as on the value of the property. On the face of a bill, in addition to general 
information, there is property-based information. First, the rentable value is the value of the property, 
certified by the Land Valuation Board. Second, the rate impost is the percentage rate charged on a 
property´s value, and depends on the classification of the zone in which the property is situated and the 
purpose for which the property is used. However, if the current charge (the product of the ratable value 
and the rate impost is less than the minimum charge defined for that rating zone, the minimum charge 
applies (Global Property Guide 2016; PwC 2016).  
Finally, 8 percent of rental income is taxed (Lamudi 2016) and there is also a stamp duty, i.e. a tax on 
documents created for the purposes of recording transactions. It is charged on conveyance or sale of 
immovable property at an applicable rate ranging from 0.25 percent to 1 percent and 0.05 Ghana cedi 
(GHS) to GHS 25, depending on the type of transaction and the instrument. Similarly, the stamp duty on 
leases applies rates that range from 0.5 percent to 1 percent of the consideration, but are also 
dependent on the lease period (Deloitte 2016).  
Discussion of land tax reform options  
Government is mandated to allocate a proportion of collected national revenue to the local assemblies 
to drive development. In this way, cities and towns have no incentive to increase local taxes, as transfers 
from central government are high. There are some local expert voices advocating for land taxation on 
idle lands to compel people to develop their lands “rather than leaving them idle and creaming off 
profits when the value has increased and just have to sell them” (International Property Tax Institute 
2016). Hence, land taxes might also be used as an instrument to curb land speculation. 
Land rent taxation would need to build on a more accurate system of land titles. If such a system would 
protect the customary rights of all members of a community, this would clearly be beneficial, and would 
be most attractive in the peri-urban regions of the south. Formal land title has been identified as 
particularly important for women in the context of climate adaptation, e.g. to secure credits for 
adaptation action (Antwi-Agyei, Dougill, and Stringer 2015). However, improving women’s access to 
land, e.g. by changes in inheritance law, can only go so far if social norms on gendered access to land 
continue to discriminate against women, especially on customary land (Lambrecht 2016).  
Comprehensive land reform is challenging in that it would need to work with partially dysfunctional 
institutions, like the Lands Commission, and would be well advised to respect the sometimes well-
designed regional community specifications of customary land. Land rent taxation would be most 
straightforward in urban and peri-urban areas, where land titles are better established and land values 
are of relevant margins.  
4.3.4.  Peru 
Economic growth in Peru is strongly influenced by international commodity prices: growth jumped to 9 
percent per year in 2007 and 2008, driven by higher world market prices for minerals and metals as 
well as the government's trade liberalisation strategies. After reduced growth in the face of the world 
recession and lower commodity export prices, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates Peru will 
achieve a growth rate of 3.7 percent in 2016, and 4.1 percent in 2017, which is above the world 
average (IMF 2016).  
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Main characteristics of current land tenure and land tax regime 
A wave of land titles granted in the period 1988-1995 under the guidance of Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto during the Fujimori period provided formal land titles to about 1.2 million families. To 
date, however, more than 70 percent of landholders still lack official proof of their property. High 
administrative costs for registering land titles are the main obstacle for smallholders and indigenous 
communities to obtain official approval of their land. Customary law hitherto governs them. Further, 
social conflicts arise due to claims of extractive industries on land surrounding the area of operation and 
on indigenous territory (Bebbington and Bury 2009)48  
The real estate property tax is levied on the value of urban and rural real estate property. The tax rate is 
set by the national government but is collected by local authorities, as it constitutes one of the main 
municipal taxes. Municipalities assess the value of the property based on fiscal characteristics (area of 
land, area of construction, installations, age, etc.), taking into account depreciation (due to age, 
conservation state, etc.) and unit values (i.e. PEN/m²). The latter two are fixed every fiscal year by the 
national Ministry for Housing, Construction, and Sanitation (Centro de Gestión Tributaria de Chiclayo 
2016; Rojas 2015). Individuals and legal entities owning the referred real estate properties are 
considered taxpayers for such purposes. Tax rates range from 0.2 percent to 1 percent of the property 
value and increase progressively with real estate value. Further taxes apply to the transfer of property. 
Discussion of land tax reform options  
Property taxes on real estate amount to about 0.4 percent of GDP (and roughly 1.5 percent of the public 
budget) (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas 2015). Higher revenues from land-related taxes could be 
used to reduce other distortionary taxes, e.g. VAT or income taxes. Another way in which land tax 
revenue could increase social welfare could be increased public investment. To date, about 15 percent of 
the population lacks access to clean water and electricity, and almost 30 percent to sanitation. Access 
gaps are especially pronounced in rural areas. Additional revenues from land taxation could provide the 
financial means to close these gaps.  
As it is part of the municipal real estate tax, the land tax system can be considered as decentralized, 
which constrains redistribution across municipalities or administrative regions. The potential of using 
land tax revenues for improving infrastructure in poor rural areas is therefore limited, as these revenues 
are typically low in poor areas. Additionally, past experiences with the ‘canon minero’, which 
redistributes revenues from taxes and revenues paid by mining companies to the regions and 
municipalities in which these operations are located, suggest that that those additional funds have 
tended to yield little benefit for the recipients. This is probably due to limited institutional and 
administrative capacities to undertake well-targeted investment, as well as incentives to use spending as 
a device to reward special interest groups (Loayza and Rigolini 2016).  
Our quantitative analysis reveals that land taxes might only have a modest role for increasing the 
government budget since housing rents are low (around 1 percent of GDP) and data on agricultural 
rents are missing. Nevertheless, land taxes would put a larger burden on poorer households, which may 
pay up to 2 percent of their income for a 50 percent land tax. Only the non-linear land tax puts a 
stronger relative burden on richer households. 
About 57 percent of Peru’s land area is covered by forests and deforestation, but expansion of 
agricultural land is a major environmental concern. About 10 percent of tropical rainforest had already 
been lost by 2014. The recently released national strategy on forests and climate change (Ministerio del 
Ambiente 2016) aims at net zero deforestation by 2021, thereby protecting 3.5 mio hectares of forest 
                                                             
48 See also the communication by (Colectivo Territorios Seguros del Peru and Plataforma para la Gobernanza Responsable de la 
Tierra 2014) 
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until 2030.  This goal is to be achieved by improving mapping and monitoring of forests and by 
providing economic incentives to conserve forest (Ministerio del Ambiente 2016). As discussed in 
Section 2.3, a land unit tax on agricultural or deforested land could provide an additional incentive to 
refrain from deforestation, together with mechanisms to actively reward avoided deforestation.  
4.3.5.  Nicaragua 
In Central America, the extraordinary concentration of land ownership in the hands of a small 
agricultural elite has been seen by both reformers and revolutionaries as a primary cause of the 
impoverishment of the rural majority, and as a fundamental obstacle to equitable development. With a 
per-capita GDP of 1,849 USD, Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries on the American continent; six 
percent of households live below the international poverty line (1.90 USD/day) while half of the rural 
population lives below the national poverty line (Table 2).  
Main characteristics of current land tenure and land tax regime 
Nicaragua is characterized by a very unequal distribution of land ownership and high tenure insecurity, 
reflecting a Gini coefficient of land ownership distribution of 0.86, much higher than in Asian countries 
(Deininger, Zegarra, and Lavadenz 2003a). In fact, lack of access to land has been determined as a major 
determinant of poverty (Merlet and Pommier 2000). The country was subject to export-driven boom-
and-bust cycles driving land use, dominated in the late 19th by an export boom in coffee; and in the 
Somoza period from 1936 until 1979 by a livestock and cotton export boom. Notably, these export 
booms were associated with the appropriation of frontier land by politically well-connected individuals.  
From 1979 on, the revolutionary Sandista government attempted to change the situation by 
implementing a land reform program, but effects were small as civil war continued. After the regime 
change in 1990, conflicting land titles originating from the pre-Sandista and the Sandista period led to 
partial insecurity in land tenure. A land reform program between 1995 and 2001 provided 30,000 land 
titles by increasing land tenure security even under otherwise detrimental conditions. Even as land 
reform is implemented, access to land through inheritance remains fundamental. For example, in the 
province of Masaya, 40 percent of land was acquired through inheritance, 35% percent through the land 
reform, and 25% percent through the land market (De Janvry and Sadoulet 2001). Various land market 
imperfections and land holdings for speculative, status or wealth portfolio reasons by a small land-based 
elite are considered as impeding the functioning of the agricultural sector and reducing agricultural 
efficiency (Deininger, Zegarra, and Lavadenz 2003a). This is also reflected by the low yields in Table 2.  
Local taxes are relatively high, over 2 percent of GDP (United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) 
2008) and make up a significant portion of total government revenues. Interestingly, property taxes are 
less important, accounting for around 6 percent of local tax revenues – much less than sales taxes and 
business taxes (World Bank 2003). The property tax base is the value of land, buildings, and permanent 
improvements provided by either cadastral value, self-declared value, or estimated value, in order of 
preference. However, assessed values seem to be well below market values, and it appears to be very 
difficult to keep values up to date. Property transfers are subject to a transfer tax of 1 to 3 percent on 
the purchase price, depending on the value of the transferred property. The transfer of property is also 
subject to a municipal revenue tax (IMI) of 1 percent over the highest value between the purchase price 
established in the transfer deed and the cadastral value established by the municipality. Stamp taxes or 
property registration fees are 1 percent, with a maximum amount of USD 1,370. The annual property 
taxes are typically 1 percent of the taxable value, but since taxable value is set at 80 percent of the 
cadastral value (or, as the case may be, self-declared value), the effective rate is 0.8 percent. However, 
many exemptions apply: for example residential properties of less than 10,000 colones (in general) or 
40,000 colones (in Managua) are exempt. In rural areas, this exemption may include up to 1 hectare of 
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land (World Bank 2003).49 Rental income from property in Nicaragua is taxed as normal income for tax 
purposes, with a progressive rate for residents of up to 25 percent and a flat rate of 15 percent for non-
residents. Finally, a charge of 4 percent is levied on the gift or inheritance of property (International 
Living 2016; DGI 2017).  
Discussion of land tax reform options  
A comprehensive reform on land tenure and land taxation can have substantial agricultural co-benefits. 
Formalizing land titles benefits largely the poor, as they often hold contested land titles and are 
disproportionally affected by insecure land titles. Taxing land value could reduce speculative and 
inefficient acquisition of land by the rich, and provide incentives for more productive allocation (Strasma 
et al. 1987; Deininger, Zegarra, and Lavadenz 2003b). 
Our quantitative analysis reveals that agricultural rents contribute to almost 5 percent of GDP while 
housing land rents contribute to almost 3 percent of GDP (Table 4). Hence, even moderate land tax rates 
can increase the government budget substantially (Table 5). The direct income effect is, however, 
strongest for the poorest households where income may decrease between 2 and 4 percent for linear 
tax rates. This finding seems to be at odds with the existence of a small rural land elite that owns large 
shares of the land. In fact, our data confirms the existence of such an elite if we look at agricultural land 
only (see Figure 12 in Appendix 7.9.2): among those households who own agricultural land, the richest 
20 percent gain more than one-third of their income from agricultural rents. However, as this 
agricultural elite is a relatively small part of the top quintile, and as most of the top quintile have urban 
property captured by the housing component, the agricultural land rents of the rural elite are not 
directly visible in our statistics on total land rent.  
Revenues from land rent taxation could be further used to support smaller farmers with education and 
access to credit markets.  Land taxes could be implemented with few technical barriers as the cadastral 
valuation methods used already differentiate between structures and land, also with detailed valuation 
for agricultural land, for both infrastructure in place and terrain characteristics (PGR 2016). Because 
rural land is rather concentrated in Nicaragua (see Figure 12 in Appendix 7.9.2), a comprehensive land 
tax reform might provoke substantial resistance from the rural land elite.  
4.3.6.  Indonesia 
Indonesia, which consists of more than 17,000 islands and approximately 250 million people, is the 
world's fourth-most-populous country. Indonesia had a growth rate of 4.7 percent in 2015. It follows an 
economic policy of promoting foreign and domestic investment as well as exports of goods other than 
energy and mineral resources to expedite economic development (PwC, 2015). However, the real estate 
market is going through a downturn, particularly in large cities due to: a) the significant increase of land 
prices in the last 5 years; b) recent regulation issued by the central bank, which requires real estate end 
users to supply a down payment of at least 30 percent as a prerequisite for loans from local banks50. Yet, 
the demand for residential apartments, condominiums and office buildings is still high (Adwani and 
Ahadu Deradjat 2015).  
                                                             
49 “Other exemptions include: indigenous communities, associations of municipalities, agricultural cooperative during their first 
two years, non-profit welfare and social assistance organizations, houses occupied by pensioners, universities and higher 
technical institutions, cultural, scientific, sport, and artistic institutions, unions and professional and business (non-profit) 
associations, and enterprises operating in export free zones.” (World Bank 2003).  
50Bank of Indonesia, September 2013 
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Main characteristics of current land tenure and land tax regime 
Indonesia sees land as its most valuable resource, thus the government and National Land Agency aim at 
developing and managing land for the welfare of the people. Land status is divided in state land and 
privately used land, with state land accounting for more than two-thirds of total land (which is largely 
forest land) (Yusuf 2011). Land regulation is extraordinarily complex with an estimated 572 plus laws, 
regulations, and other documents relating to land and formal government processes. Privately used land 
consists on land that has, depending on tenure type, certain rights to it attached, regardless of whether 
it is registered or not.  
The National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional, BPN) issues the land title certificates that allow 
the holder to use the land concerned. Cadastral data on land titles registered at the land office is open to 
the public. They include details on the land and the owner, issue date and period of validity of the land 
title and historical transfers or any encumbrance (mortgage) over the land title (National Land Agency 
Indonesia 2016; Center for International Private Enterprise and International Real Property Foundation 
2016). 
Regional governments may issue regulations on land tenure and taxation, but they should comply with 
the broad policy guidelines set under Law No. 28 of 2009 regarding Regional Tax and Retribution. The 
inherent need for periodic renewal of the land title certificate is an automatic process for extracting fees 
rather than a tool for effective land use management (Yusuf 2011; State of the Republic of Indonesia 
1960). Foreign individuals who reside in Indonesia can only hold a right to use of one single residential 
unit.  
Buildings are not legally part of the land and there is a separate title for commercial buildings –i.e. one 
person’s building can exists on another’s land (Yusuf 2011). The valuation of land and constructions is 
the responsibility of regional governments, obtaining the assessed value of the property (NJOP). 
However, the tax base (NJKP) is a predetermined proportion of the NJOP51.  
Indonesia has a real property tax (Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan/PBB) that consists of two main parts. The 
first part is a tax on urban and rural land and property, which is under the responsibility of regional 
governments. This part is commonly known as PBB (P2) (Perkotaan dan Pedesaan/ urban and rural) and 
is payable annually on land, buildings, and permanent structures. Thresholds are stipulated regionally52 
and tax rates are progressive, with a maximum of 0.3 percent of the assessed value (NJKP)5354. The 
second part is a tax on plantation, mining, and industrial forest (part of the forest area managed by the 
private sector under concession from the government), which is under the authority of the central 
government. This part is commonly known as PBB (P3) (Perkebunan, Pertambangan, and Perhutanan/ 
plantation, mining, and forestry). Further land or property related taxes or duties apply to the transfer of 
property and sales of luxury property, as well as income from property rental.  
Discussion of land tax reform options  
Differentiated land unit taxes could play a larger role in slowing deforestation and directing urban 
expansion. Indonesia is a global hotspot of deforestation and biodiversity loss, represented by the likely 
future extinction of the Orang-Utan. Deforestation and land conversion for the creation of largely 
                                                             
51 NJKP is currently stipulated to be either 20% of NJOP (for NJOP up to IDR 1 billion) or 40% of NJOP (for NJOP above IDR 1 
billion).  
52 The non-taxable NJOP is set at IDR 10 million at the minimum. Any changes are to be made by issuing a PERDA. In Jakarta, 
the non-taxable NJOP is set at IDR 60 million.  
53 For example, if the tax base (NJKP) is stipulated to be 20% of the assessed value (NJOP) (for NJOP up to IDR 1 billion), the 
application of a tax rate of 0.5%, leads to an effective PBB of 0.1% (properties < IDR 1 billion). 
54 Progressive effective tax rates: IDR (US$)54 < 200 million (US$14,859): 0,01%; 200 million – 2 billion (US$148,588): 0.1%; 
2 billion – 10 billion (US$742,942): 0.2% > 10 billion (US$742,942): 0.3%.  
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community-owned cropland is primarily driven by land clearance for palm oil plantations, a main export 
staple crop. Under the business-as-usual scenario, intact forest cover will decline to 4 percent by 2020, 
but protecting both intact and logged forest can decrease carbon emission reductions of 21 percent 
(Carlson et al. 2012). Case studies demonstrate that plantation schemes are closely entangled with land 
tenure (Creutzig et al. 2013). For example, in Jambi province, high capital requirements for plantations 
crowd out poor settlers even if supported by the government at the beginning, and establishment of 
large-scale plantations severely compromises land access for customary users, mostly indigenous 
populations (Creutzig et al. 2013). Governance of equal access to land occurs at the local, national and 
global scale (i.e. palm oil certification schemes in Europe) (Hunsberger et al. 2014). While deforestation 
involves environmental costs, urbanization may have adverse effects on food supply: urbanization is 
projected to consume 0.6Mha of cropland (1.1 percent of Indonesia’s cropland), which is twice as 
productive as the average cropland in Indonesia (Brend’Amour et al. 2016). Differentiated land unit 
taxes on agricultural land could help reduce area expansion and deforestation; if taxes on housing land 
are substantially higher than on agricultural land, they could also help slow down urban sprawl. In any 
case, a simultaneous regulatory framework on land uses needs to be in place, as land taxes may only help 
shift incentives but constitute in rare cases hard constraints on land use change. A crucial issue here is 
also the political will to limit deforestation, as communities might also benefit from land conversion.  
Currently, land and building taxes are roughly 4 percent of all tax revenues and 0.7 percent of GDP 
(Amir, Asafu-Adjaye, and Ducpham 2013b) although tax revenues from recurrent property taxes are 
reported to be only 0.2 percent of GDP according to OECD.Stat (see Table 3). Our analysis highlights the 
minor role of agricultural land rents for Indonesian households as agricultural land rents represent less 
than 1 percent of GDP. Housing rents reach almost 2 percent of GDP. A 25 percent land rent tax would 
generate tax revenues of almost 0.9 percent of GDP and (1.7 percent for a 50 percent tax rate). Hence, 
Indonesia seems to already capture a substantial share of land rents, though land tax revenues from 
large domestic and foreign agricultural companies and state-owned enterprises are not covered by our 
simulation. In general, experts see more potential to increase tax revenues because local governments 
have low capacity to enforce tax collection, face strong opposition and low acceptance in dealing with 
sizable tax liabilities (Von Haldenwang 2015). According to our simulations, land taxes would also be 
regressive, as they would reduce income of the poorest households by 5 percent for a 50 percent tax 
rate. Non-linear taxes would almost completely exempt poor households and result in an increasing tax 
burden over the different income quintiles. 
There are frequent coordination problems between tax agencies, the agricultural department, the 
national land agency and the relevant work units of local governments to harmonize data and enforce 
compliance.55 As the government is facing difficulties in meeting its 2015 revenue target, it is working 
together with the House of Representatives on the Bill of Land to revise the financial transactions 
involving property. At this stage, it is not clear when the Bill of Land will be enacted into law, since 
discussions are still ongoing (National Land Agency Indonesia 2016; Adwani and Ahadu Deradjat 2015). 
As the main motivation for this reform is driven by revenue raising, the focus is mainly on housing 
properties, hence it does not consider other land uses that are quite relevant for the Indonesian case.   
However, Indonesia illustrates the challenges of a country faced with management issues regarding its 
significant forest and natural resources and the problems that may be associated with legal pluralism, 
that is, the coexistence of the national state law with customary laws (adat) that govern Indonesia’s 
traditional communal land tenure system. In this context, many opportunities exist for Indonesia to 
overcome obstacles that prevent economic actors from gaining more secure rights to land and, thus, for 
society to fully benefit from the advantages of land as a safety net and to respond to incentives for 
sustainable management and investment (Delninger, Selod, and Burns 2011). Hence, over the last few 
years, changes in the policies, practices and legal framework at the regional level have taken place very 
quickly. New issues and initiatives such as the insistence on recognition of adat community rights, 
efforts to settle and resolve land conflicts, and REDD+ try to address environmental and social issues 
(Earth Innovation Institute 2015; Busch et al. 2012; Carlson et al. 2012). They have also impacted the 
                                                             
55 See, e.g. :  http://www.antaranews.com/berita/580547/kpk-hanya-sepertiga-perusahaan-sawit-yang-kena-pajak  
     35 
 
 
 
 
composition and character of the law and policies. Regions issue policies that are inconsistent with 
national regulations, while the national framework does little to accommodate the progressive dynamics 
of land management at the regional level (Earth Innovation Institute 2015). In spite of unique regional 
practices, a national reform towards a land tax that includes all land uses may be the required method 
for including all non-monetary values in the land market.   
4.3.7.  Vietnam  
Main characteristics of current land tenure and land tax regime 
Vietnam offers a splendid window into the complex and intricate dynamics of land tenure arrangements. 
In pre-colonial times, traditional village arrangements granted tillers usufruct rights (even as the local 
landlord appropriated the surplus as a monopolist). French colonial rule brought administration, legal 
enforcement and market economics to Vietnam, inciting an ultimately unsuccessful peasant revolution, , 
even as peasants were supposed to be freed. The reason behind this uprising was not a higher average 
rate of exploitation, but rather the clash of peasant needs with those of a modern state. The state 
required constant income realized by constant tax rates on land and heads. But the farmers viewed this 
arrangement unfavorably, as it would severely compromise their subsistence needs in times of climatic 
or socio-economic crisis56. The ignorance of a system that could not understand the need for minimum 
subsistence income resulted in moral outrage with peasants risking their lives in a revolution that was 
bound to fail (Scott 1977).  
In colonial times, farmland was owned by only a few French plantation owners or Vietnamese landlords, 
while 60 percent of farmers were landless (Do and Iyer 2008). When colonial rule ended in 1954, 
Vietnam split into northern and southern parts, and land began to be collectivized in North Vietnam in 
accordance with communist ideology. 68 percent of total farmland was brought into cooperatives by 
1960.  In South Vietnam, pro-landowner policies were adopted and ownership rights for cultivators 
were granted (Land-to-Tiller law) to increase the popularity of the government during the Vietnam War. 
However, landlords successfully opposed its implementation. In 1975, the country was reunified and 
land collectivization also started in the south, but with little success. 
Land tenure and incentives for agricultural activity were dismal in the 1980s, to the point that Vietnam 
even needed to import rice. This started to change with a new law in 1988 that granted land use rights 
to individual households. Specifically, land was allocated to households with 10-15 years of secure 
tenure but no possibilities to trade such land use rights. In 1993, the land law made these rights 
pledgeable and tradable (that is, land use rights could be inherited, transfered, exchanged, leased and 
mortgaged). However, a high transaction tax of 10 percent, implemented until 1999, led to very low 
turnover of land.  
The 1993 law that made land tradable lead to a small but statistically significant change in crop choice 
and long-term agricultural investment (Do and Iyer 2008). Importantly, female-only held land use rights 
(but not male or jointly held land use rights) reduced the incidence of children’s illness, increased school 
enrollment, and reduced household’s drug expenditure (Menon, Van Der Meulen Rodgers, and Nguyen 
2014). A change in law by form only in 2003, which specified that land titles must also bear the name of 
the spouse (nearly always the woman), translated into more bargaining rights for women and resulted in 
lower participation of girls in agricultural production but significantly higher educational attainment 
(Matz and Narciso 2010). In 2013, the National Assembly further approved the Revised Land Law, which 
will give farmers 50-year use rights to all their agricultural land, including their basic, annual-cropland. 
Furthermore, the state supports infrastructure investments, science and the application of modern 
                                                             
56 This ‚moral economy‘ perspective is critically discussed in the political economy literature pointing to the importance of 
individual decision making in corporate villages (Popkin 1979). 
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technology for paddy rice to increase yield and quality (Phuoc et al. 2016; Cong Thang and Bao Linh 
2014). In this sense, the most notable benefits might be only visible in differential analysis of a 
comprehensive set of welfare analysis, and might only fully unfold over time.   
Discussion of land tax reform options  
Since 1993, the Agricultural Land Tax applies to all organizations and individuals using land for 
agricultural production including cultivated land, water surfaces used for aquaculture, forestry land, and 
other businesses that are allocated agricultural land). It is based on the productive capacity of the land 
expressed in kilograms of rice. Following international trends to reduce tax burdens on agricultural 
producers, the government introduced a 50 percent exemption to all taxpayers and a full exemption 
applicable to the following cases: the “standard” and unit assigned to agricultural families, poor 
communities and agricultural cooperatives (Cong Thang and Bao Linh 2014). Crucially, these policies, 
together with land use charges and registration fees, land use right transfers and sales of state-owned 
houses and land rent taxes on agricultural and housing land, lack buoyancy and represent a declining 
revenue base (William J. McCluskey and Trinh 2013). To address these shortcomings, the government 
decided to replace the pre-existing rice-based tax on land and housing57 to one based on an estimate of 
land and property value. Two options were considered: an area-based approach that includes both land 
and buildings, and an approach based only on land value(SCNP 2010). In 2010, the National Parliament 
approved Law number 48/2010/QH12, which created the Non-Agricultural Land Use Tax, i.e. a land 
value tax (VNP 2010).  
The newly adopted Non-Agricultural Land Use Tax applies to residential, commercial and industrial land 
(where agricultural land, improvements and structures are exempted). This means that only 4 percent of 
the total area of land is subject to the land tax (William J. McCluskey and Trinh 2013; GSO 2011). The 
tax base is an adjusted value defined by multiplying the land area by the land tariff, as determined by the 
local and/or regional authorities. This tariff remains fixed for a period of 5 years. The tax rate is a 
progressive rate ranging from 0.03 percent to 0.15 percent58 for residential property and a flat rate of 
0.03 percent for commercial and industrial land (PwC 2016). Finally, rental income taxes are levied on 
the average annual income on a rental apartment/property (the sale and rent of buildings is subject to a 
VAT of 10 percent.). 
Recent work by (William J. McCluskey and Trinh 2013) simulates the revenues of the new land tax 
compared to the old system. Their results show an increase only from 0.06 percent to 0.08 percent of 
GDP for the year 2008, assuming a 60 percent revenue collection level59. Furthermore, given the fixed 
nature of the tax rates and land value tariffs, nominal revenue as a percentage of GDP declines in the 
following years. The desirability of an adjustment to the current tax reform comes from stabilizing 
revenues, which are currently still declining, by addressing several structural problems that will directly 
enhance revenue buoyancy. The choice of a land tax is in many respects the optimal choice, and the 
revenue performance is modest but has room for future growth (William J. McCluskey and Trinh 2013). 
                                                             
57 The Land and Housing Tax was introduced in 1992. It applied to residential, commercial and industrial land. The tax base was 
determined on the basis of there factors: land surface, its rice-based productivity and a variable coefficient between 3 and 30 
applied progressively according to the value of the urban land. This tax faced crucial problems derived from the arbitrary nature 
of the coefficients given their weak correlation with market land values. Furthermore, the fact that the tax liability was directly 
linked with the price of rice brings food-security related issues upfront. The purpose of this tax was to raise revenue enough to 
finance development infrastructure and public services. Although revenues have been constantly rising since 1996,they 
stagnated at 0.06% GDP, with low chances for a significant increase given its design, unable to capture the growth in residential 
and commercial real estate values (William J. McCluskey and Trinh 2013). 
58 0.03 percent: Area within standard; land used for underground construction or multiple apartment buildings.  
0.07 percent: area greater than standard but not exceeding 3 times the standard.  
0.15 percent: area exceeding 3 times the standard; unused land; land use for inappropriate purposes.  
0.20 percent: Illegally used land. Source: (VNP 2010; William J. McCluskey and Trinh 2013).  
59 Collections ratios in developing countries are typically around 60–80% (Kelly 2000).  
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In moving forward, Vietnam urgently needs to increase its human capacity for valuation through the 
creation of appropriate structures for the education and training of appraisers. The immaturity of the 
property market and poorly-established land tenure system indicates that the selected tax reform using 
an area based approach would be even more successful (Rao 2008). A further step would be to consider 
higher tax rates, as current rates (limited to a maximum 0.15 percent) seem to have difficulties in 
fulfilling the revenue raising requirements. Further changes would also require government intervention 
in terms of providing an accessible banking system. Land rights must be complemented with the ability 
to make use of them.   
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we re-examined an old claim in economics that using land taxes is a first-best choice of 
government finance with respect to the particular situation of developing countries. A major advantage 
of taxes that capture land rents is their economic efficiency, as deadweight losses are zero due to the 
fixed tax base. This efficiency advantage could be higher for developing countries than for developed 
countries because of the existence of a large informal sector. The marginal cost of funds of taxes that 
apply to activities, goods or services in the formal economy increases if activities can be shifted into the 
informal sector.  
The revenue potential of land taxes is difficult to assess, as different methods and data sets yield 
different estimates of land rents. Macro-estimates on agricultural land rents based on revenues and 
production costs tend to provide larger numbers (up to 10 to 20 percent of GDP) than estimates based 
on household data (around 1 to 5 percent of GDP). While household data is subject to underreporting, 
macro-estimates consider neither location-specific rents nor ownership and distribution of rents. 
Additionally, household data do not include the land rents that accrue to large commercial firms, 
foreigners or state-owned enterprises. Reliable macro-estimates on urban land rents are not available at 
all. Our estimates based on the household data suggest urban land rents to be around 1 to 3 percent of 
GDP. Hence, total land rents form up to 7 percent of total income if only rent income of households is 
considered. This is a large potential for land taxes to become a relevant source of government revenue. 
Taxing half of these rents increases government budgets by 15 percent for several of our considered 
case study countries. These additional revenues are highly needed for increasing investments in 
infrastructure to address development goals and continue urbanization trends.  
Besides their efficiency properties, land taxes provide a number of co-benefits: depending on their 
design as a unit tax or differential tax, they can alter land use dynamics, reduce area expansion and 
provide higher incentives to put land under to most efficient use. Holding back land due to speculative or 
other motives is a concern in several countries, including Nicaragua or Ghana. Land taxes might 
therefore not only be relevant in countries that aim to reduce deforestation or urban sprawl, but also in 
regions where land is idle or is not used productively.  
The large revenue potential is in stark contrast to the currently low revenues from land-based taxes in 
developing countries that are far below 1 percent of GDP (around 0 to 0.2  percent of GDP in our case 
study countries). Also, land taxes are hardly used as a tool for environmental or spatial planning policy. 
Why is this great potential not used so far? There are various explanations ranging from high 
administrative costs and compliance problems to political economy and distributional aspects. While 
some of them are valid, others lack a rigorous base or can in principle be addressed with reasonable 
effort. 
High administrative costs of setting up and running a land registry, assessing land values and enforcing 
compliance are a widespread argument against land and property taxes. Looking into actual costs, 
however, reveals that administrative costs are of similar magnitude as other taxes. Moreover, it is low tax 
rates that contribute to an unfavorable cost-to-collection ratio for  property or land taxes. The costs of 
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setting up land registries and formalizing land tenure are moderate – they are not only 
overcompensated by tax revenues (often within the first year), but also provide substantial co-benefits 
with respect to sustainable land use, investments and access to credit. Further options to reduce 
administrative costs include using unit taxes that are differentiated among broader spatial units and not 
on valuation of individual plots and excluding smaller plots from paying the tax at all (which is already 
implemented in Vietnam based on a “standard” assignation to poorer households). Additionally, remote 
sensing techniques and statistical approaches can be useful for large countries while hybrid or self-
reporting approaches can be particularly useful for smaller countries. 
Compliance and low taxpayer morale is a major issue in many developing countries. However, 
compliance problems of land taxes need to be evaluated against compliance and evasion problems of 
alternative taxes like income, value added or trade taxes. All of these taxes suffer from substantial 
evasion no smaller than that of land or property taxes. Compliance can be increased substantially by 
improving the quality of the land tax authority and providing appropriate incentives. As property is 
visible, land and property taxes are in principle more difficult to evade than taxes on consumption, 
income or goods.  
While administrative costs and compliance problems cannot be considered as hard constraints for land 
tax implementation, political economy can indeed be considered as such. In most countries, land taxes 
are regulated and collected by local authorities and are hence part of a fiscal decentralization approach. If 
central governments are reluctant to empower local authorities, land and property taxes will not enjoy 
the support they need. The household data reveals, however, that land ownership and also land rent 
income is rather uniformly distributed among the income classes, except for agricultural land in 
Nicaragua. Hence, the tax would be carried by a large share of the population. This creates ‘ownership’ in 
the tax which improves public spending as taxpayers held their (local) government accountable for the 
taxes they pay.  If land is owned by powerful elites, like in rural Nicaragua, or protected by international 
agreements on foreign land investment, land taxation will face severe opposition. Gradual reform with 
low tax rates that increase slowly over long time periods can be more feasible in such contexts. 
Finally, as the household data for our case study countries reveal, land ownership is prevalent among all 
income groups in developing countries, including the poorest households. Moreover, in many cases a 
linear land tax would put a larger relative tax burden on the poor than on wealthier countries. Hence, 
land taxes (if not compensated by additional measures) have adverse effects on the poor and might even 
increase poverty rates. Exempting small land holdings from land taxation does not only reduce the cost-
to-collected-revenue ratio, but also further prevents poor households from being adversely affected by 
the tax and turns the tax into a progressive one. Non-linear or progressive schemes for land or property 
taxes are already used in Rwanda, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Earmarking tax revenues for 
investments in pro-poor (local) infrastructure and improvements in local amenities further reduces 
adverse effects on the poor and increases acceptance, as taxpayers directly enjoy the benefits.  
The experience with land taxes in developing countries – as well as with property taxes which share 
some of the characteristics of land taxes but additionally tax investments – shows that they can be part 
of a fiscal strategy to diversify government revenues, increase the tax base and reduce the deadweight 
losses of distortionary taxes. But land tax reforms are also one step towards comprehensive green tax 
reforms where increasingly natural resource rents and environmental externalities are taxed. According 
to the World Bank (2011b), natural resource rents in 2010 amounted to more than US$ 3 trillion 
globally. Despite the volatility of natural resource prices, revenues of this magnitude could, if employed 
properly on the domestic level, eradicate large parts of global poverty and inequality (Segal 2011) and 
finance access to basic infrastructure (Fuss et al. 2016). Energy subsidies constitute on average 5 
percent of GDP in Sub-Sahara Africa (Coady et al. 2015). Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and putting a 
price on carbon are crucial policy instruments for reducing carbon emissions and complying with the 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) announced for the Paris agreement.  
International development cooperation could play an important role in supporting the build-up of the 
required institutional capacity (VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001) in line with the Addis Ababa convention 
to make fiscal systems more broad, fair and efficient.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1. Countries with Land Taxation Experience 
Table 6 Countries with Land Taxation Experience 
  Tax base Assessment method 
North America   
Canada Land; property tax  Market value 
United States Land; property tax Market value 
Europe & Central Asia   
Austria Vacant land; property tax Cadastral value 
Denmark Land; property tax Market value 
Estonia Land Cadastral value 
Finland Land; property tax - 
France Land; property tax - 
Hungary Unimproved land; property tax Area based; market value - self assessment 
Italy Vacant land; property tax Market value - rent 
Latvia Land; property tax Market value 
Lithuania Land; property tax Cadastral value 
Romania Land; property tax Area based 
Russia Land; property tax Area based 
Slovakia Land; property tax Cadastral value 
Slovenia Land; property tax Area based 
Ukraine Land; property tax Area based - self assessment 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Argentina Agricultural land; property tax Cadastral value 
Barbados Land; -  - 
Belize Land; -  - 
Chile Agricultural land; property tax Cadastral value 
Colombia Agricultural land; property tax Cadastral value - self assessment 
Grenada Land; -  - 
Jamaica Land; - Cadastral value 
Mexico Land; property tax Market value 
Mexico Land; property tax Market value 
Montserrat Land; -  - 
Uruguay Agricultural land; property tax Cadastral value 
South East Asia and the Pacific 
Australia Land; property tax Market value; rental value; combination 
Bangladesh Agricultural land; property tax Area based 
China Occupied land; property tax Area based; market value; rental value 
Ethiopia Agricultural land; property tax Area based - land use fee 
Fiji Land; -  - 
India Agricultural land; property tax Rental value; area based; market value 
Indonesia Agricultural land; property tax Market value 
Japan Land; property tax (including tangible business assets) Market value  
Malaysia Agricultural land; property tax Area based 
New Zealand Land; property tax Market value 
Pakistan Agricultural land; property tax Area based 
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  Tax base Assessment method 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Land; -  - 
Philippines Agricultural land; property tax Market value - self assessment 
Solomon 
Islands 
Land; -  - 
South Korea Land; -  - 
Sri Lanka Agricultural land; property tax Area based 
Taiwan Land; -  Self assessment 
Thailand Land; property tax Market value - rent - self assessment 
Middle East & Africa   
Egypt Agricultural land; property tax Area based 
Kenya Land; property tax (including tangible business assets) Area based; market value; or combination 
Malawi Land; -  - 
Namibia Land; -  - 
South Africa Land; property tax Market value 
Swaziland Land; -  - 
Tanzania Land; -  - 
Tunisia Unimproved land; property tax Area based - rent 
Zambia Land; -  - 
Zimbabwe Land; -  - 
Note: based on (Dye and England 2010; Richard Miller Bird and Slack 2004; William J McCluskey and Franzsen 2005; Fernandez Milan, Kapfer, 
and Creutzig 2016; Khan 2001). Countries have only a land-based tax (“Land”); others have a complementary property tax (“property tax”), or 
there is no available information whether additional taxes on property exist (“land; -“).
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7.2. Equilibrium models on land taxes 
Table 7 Overview on model calculations on land tax reforms 
Country/ 
Region 
Urban vs. Rural Efficiency Distribution Land Use Budget 
Balancing (BB) 
Tax Design Source 
Australia Both (not 
differentiated) 
Neutral (by design), 
but neg. MCF due to 
openness of economy 
(-) land owners bare 
the tax 
(-) foreign land 
owners vs. 
(+) domestic 
households 
Fixed (by design) Lump-sum transfer to 
households 
Tax on unimproved 
value of land  
(Cao et al. 2015) 
Western Cape, South 
Africa 
Both (rural and urban 
household groups) 
Small effect, depends 
on BB 
(+) if BB by reduction 
in sales tax 
Depends on BB, 
mostly: 
(--) white rural HH 
(-) or (+-) black rural 
HH  
(+) urban HH 
Fixed (by design) Various – most 
positive scenario: by 
decreasing sales tax 
Tax on rural land 
value 
 
(McDONALD and 
Punt 2004) 
Costa Rica Both (not 
differentiated) 
Neutral (“green” GDP 
decreases by 
negligible amount) 
(-) consumer utility 
(small effect) 
Decrease (decrease in 
deforestation) 
 Increase in land tax, 
incomplete markets 
(property rights 
undefined and hence 
social costs of 
deforestation not 
internalized) 
(Persson and 
Munasinghe 1995) 
Atlanta, Georgia 
(USA) 
Urban Increase (+) all income groups, 
lower income groups 
benefit more  
progressive tax shift 
Decrease (urban area 
and business district 
shrink, pop. density 
increased) 
Lump-sum transfer to 
all individuals, or acc. 
to endowment 
structure for model 
with diff. income 
groups 
 
 
Switch from property 
value tax to land 
value tax 
(Choi and Sjoquist 
2015)  
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Country/ 
Region 
Urban vs. Rural Efficiency Distribution Land Use Budget 
Balancing (BB) 
Tax Design Source 
Boston, USA Urban Increase    Switch from property 
value tax to split-rate 
property and land 
value tax 
(DiMasi 1987) 
New Hampshire, USA Both (not 
differentiated) 
Increase  
((+) GDP, (+) 
employment, (+) 
construction) 
(-) owners of 
residential and 
current use land (part 
of it levied to foreign 
land owners) 
(+) owners of 
commercial, industrial 
and utility properties 
 (+) some regions 
profit more than 
others (also outside 
of NH) 
(+) labor (real wages 
increase) 
- Revenue-neutral Revenue-neutral shift 
from property tax to 
land value tax 
(England 2003) 
Jamaica  LVT: increase 
CVT: modest increase 
to substantial 
decrease 
 Fixed (by design) Lump-sum transfer to 
consumers  
 (i) Land value tax 
(LVT) and (ii) capital 
value tax (CVT) 
 
(Follain and Miyake 
1986) 
Boston, USA Urban Increase    Switch from 
discriminatory to 
non-discriminatory 
property value tax 
(DiMasi 1988) 
Note. Underlying models are CGE models that simulate a change in land tax regimes with respect to efficiency, distribution and land use. 
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7.3. Costs of cadasters and land registries 
Table 8. Major World Bank financed projects on creation and maintenance of land registries or cadasters. 
Country Cost Creation of 
system vs. 
maintenance 
Project title Source 
Algeria US$ 
96.00 
million 
Creation Cadastre Project http://projects.worldbank.org/P004964/cadastre-
project?lang=en 
Armenia US$ 
10.60 
million 
Creation Title 
Registration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P057560/title-
registration-project?lang=en&tab=overview 
Bolivia US$ 
20.40 
million 
Maintenance 
(improving the land 
administration 
system within the 
current framework) 
National Land 
Administration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P006197/national-land-
administration-project?lang=en 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
US$ 
34.10 
million 
Creation Real Estate 
Registration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P128950/real-estate-
registration-project?lang=en 
Brazil US$ 
3.50 
million 
Maintenance 
(obtaining up-to-
date environmental 
cadastral data 
containing 
information about 
owners and their 
properties) 
Brazil Rural 
Environmental 
Cadastre 
Technical 
Assistance 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P120523/brazil-rural-
environmental-cadastre-technical-assistance-
project?lang=en 
El Salvador  US$ 
55.80 
million 
Maintenance 
(improve the 
execution of day-to-
day registry and 
cadastre services at 
local level) 
Land 
Administration 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P086953/land-
administration-ii?lang=en 
Ghana US$ 
55.05 
million 
Creation Land 
Administration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P071157/land-
administration-project?lang=en 
Guatemala US$ 
64.30 
million 
Creation Second Land 
Administration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P087106/land-
administration-ii-apl?lang=en 
Honduras US$ 
32.80 
million 
Maintenance 
(cadastral surveying 
and land 
regularization) 
Second Land 
Administration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P106680/land-
administration-program?lang=en 
Indonesia  US$ 
140.10 
million 
Maintenance (long-
term development 
of the Land National 
Agency's 
institutional 
capacity for land 
administration) 
Land 
Administration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P003984/land-
administration-project?lang=en 
Kosovo US$ 
13.86 
million 
Maintenance 
(improving the 
capacity of 
Municipal Cadastre 
Offices to deliver 
services) 
Real Estate 
Cadastre and 
Registration 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P101214/real-estate-
cadastre-registration?lang=en 
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Country Cost Creation of 
system vs. 
maintenance 
Project title Source 
Kyrgyzstan US$ 
7.50 
million 
Maintenance 
(digitalizing 
cadastral plans, etc.)  
Second Land and 
Real Estate 
Registration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P108178/second-land-
real-estate-registration-project?lang=en  
Laos US$ 
28.40 
million 
Creation Land Titling 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P004208/land-titling-
project?lang=en 
Macedonia US$ 
12.10 
million 
Maintenance 
(digitalizing the 
existing cadastre 
maps and plans, 
etc.)  
Real Estate 
Cadastre and 
Registration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P119688/af-real-estate-
cadastre-registration-project?lang=en 
Nicaragua US$ 
40.00 
million 
Maintenance 
(improved 
regularization, 
titling, and registry 
services) 
Second Land 
Administration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P121152/second-land-
administration-project-support-nicaragua-land-
program-prodep?lang=en&tab=overview 
Paraguay US$ 
41.10 
million 
Creation (rural 
cadastre) 
Land Use 
Rationalization 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P007911/land-use-
rationalization-project?lang=en 
Philippines US$ 
10.35 
million 
Creation (only in 
certain 
municipalities) 
Land 
Administration 
and 
Management 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P066069/land-
administration-management-project?lang=en 
Russia US$ 
101.50 
million 
Maintenance (on-
going reforms of 
the registration 
system of rights in 
immovable 
property) 
Registration 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P093050/registration-
project?lang=en 
Tajikistan US$ 
10.07 
million 
Maintenance 
(further 
development of the 
cadastral system) 
Land 
Registration & 
Cadastre System 
for Sustainable 
Agriculture 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P129313/af-land-
registration-cadastre-system-sustainable-agriculture-
project?lang=en 
Thailand US$ 
206.80 
million 
Maintenance 
(improving land 
administration 
service delivery) 
Land Titling 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P004803/land-titling-
project-03?lang=en 
Turkey US$ 
129.59 
million 
Maintenance 
(scaling up cadastre 
renovation) 
Land 
Registration and 
Cadastre 
Modernization 
Project 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P154259?lang=en 
Uzbekistan US$ 
25.00 
million 
Creation Modernization 
of Real Property 
Registration and 
Cadastre 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P151746?lang=en 
Vietnam US$ 
180.00 
million 
Maintenance 
(development and 
implementation of 
the national 
Multipurpose Land 
Information System) 
Project for 
Improved Land 
Governance and 
Databases 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P154387?lang=en 
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7.4. Detailed description of indicators used in the typology 
Indicator 1: Land–sparing (extensification). Although land sparing could refer to many land use 
practices (i.e. biodiversity loss, desertification, urban sprawl etc.) we focus on deforestation because of 
data availability and data quality. Deforestation is expressed as the percentage of forest area that has 
been lost between the years 2005 and 2015, based on FAO data (FAO 2016b).  
 
Indicator 2: Land use efficiency (intensification): Data on land use efficiencies is highly contested; 
depending on normative assumption of what is the best land use, and how and in which conditions is 
the highest potential determined countries may have different highest potential use of their land. For 
agricultural land, cereal yields for each economy expressed as area-weighted average cereal yields in 
Mcal/ha per country (average for 2010-2014) are a proxy indicator for land use efficiency. Yields 
depend also on climatic and soil conditions but also on investments, infrastructure, institutions and 
technology (Neumann et al. 2010) which leads to ongoing debates on appropriate reference points for 
calculating yield gaps.  
 
Indicator 3: Land rents Data on land values is hardly existent. The Changing Wealth of Nations Project 
(World Bank 2011b) offers country-comparable data on economic welfare with most economies 
included. Out of the reported values for nature capital60, we select the values reported for crop (rents 
from cultivating crops), pasture (rent from selling livestock products) and timber forests (rents from 
round wood and fuel wood production). We exclude non-timber forests because they do not produce 
rents, as they are not exploited. World Bank calculates the land rents as the revenues from cultivating 
the land (based on crop prices and yields) net of cultivation costs. The rent flows are summed over a 25-
year time horizon with a discount rate of 4 percent to calculate the land wealth which is finally reported. 
In order to calculate rents, we multiply the wealth figure provided by the World Bank (2011) with the 
discount rate of 4 percent used by the World Bank. The base year for calculating the rents is 2005. 
Current rents could be higher in case agricultural land expanded and crop prices increased in excess of 
production costs (the deflated FAO Cereals Price Index increased by 33 percent between 2005 and 
2015 while real fertilizer prices (World Bank GEM Database) increased in the same time by 36 percent). 
Although urban land rents have an increasing role in the world economy due to urbanization trends, no 
consistent and comprehensive data exists in this regards. Cross-checking the agricultural land rent 
values with figures from the SAGE database gives a rather consistent figure. 
 
Indicator 4: Financial demands for access to basic infrastructure expresses the required infrastructure 
costs (as a percentage of  2010 GDP) that would enable universal access (100 percent) for the 
respective countries’ populations to five types of infrastructure which are agreed to be essential in the 
development process by 2030: water, sanitation, electricity, roads, and information and communication 
technology (ICT). The World Bank defines access to improved drinking water sources as the provision of 
piped water on premises (piped household water connection located inside the user’s dwelling, plot or 
yard), and as other improved drinking water sources (public taps or stand-pipes, tube wells or boreholes, 
protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater collection). In the case of sanitation, access refers 
to the availability for use of flush/pour flush (to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines), 
ventilated improved pit latrine, pit latrine with slab, and composting toilet facilities. Access to electricity 
is defined as the percentage of households with an electricity connection (Pachauri et al. 2012). For 
telecommunications, the model assumes that access is enabled by the access to a mobile phone and 10 
minutes of airtime per day (ITU, 2014). For transportation, the model does not determine the 
population shares having access to roads, due to lack of data, but takes the length of unpaved roads as a 
                                                             
60 Natural capital is sum of Crop, Pasture Land, Timber, Non Timber Forest, Protected Areas, Oil, Natural Gas, Coal, and Minerals. 
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proxy for the demand for (paved) roads (World Bank, 2014). First, the amount of people without access 
to infrastructure in 2030 is estimated based on current access gaps and the UN population forecast for 
2030. Then costs for infrastructure expansion to close gaps are used from the literature, if available on 
country base, otherwise regional averages are used (for additional information, see (Jakob et al. 2016)).  
 
Indicator 5: Sum of trade distortions (as a percentage of GDP) provides an indication of the role of 
distortionary taxes in the economy. It is calculated as the sum of customs and other import duties and 
taxes on exports. Data is from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2016a). 
 
Indicator 6: Shares of agricultural holdings for land size area between 0 and 2 ha (as a percentage of 
total land) (FAO 2014) provide insightful information on how land is distributed among the rural 
population, and hence, the equity effects of a land tax. In principle, small holders (0-2 ha) would be 
highly affected by a land tax compared to larger holders because of their low incomes. Thus, the higher 
the share of small holders in the country, the more adverse a land tax may be for poor households.  
 
Indicator 7: Quality of land administration index. This index is part of the Doing Business Project, an 
initiative that provides objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 189 
economies and selected cities at the subnational and regional level (World Bank Group 2016). The 
quality of land administration index is measured as the sum of the scores on four other indices: the 
reliability of infrastructure, transparency of information, geographic coverage and land dispute 
resolution indices (World Bank Group 2016). The most recent round of data collection for the project 
was completed in June 2015. Data ranges from 0 to 30, however we normalize the index to values 
between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating better quality of the land administration system.  
 
Indicator 8: Control of corruption Index. This index is part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) project (World Bank 2016b); it reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests (Kauffmann and Kraay 2016). The indicator is reported in two ways: 
(1) in their standard normal units, ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes. We normalize these values to the range of 0-1.  
Table 6 describes all indicators, their data source, time scale and units. The sample size is 83 countries; it 
includes all middle and income countries where data for all indicators above mentioned is available.  
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Table 9 Description of variables and indicators used for the typology (MRY – Most recent year) 
 Variable Data Source Year Units 
1 Land sparing  Deforestation: FAO 2016: FAO, Global Forest 
Resources Assessments (FAO 2016b) 
2005-
2015 
Change forest area (% of land 
area)  
2 Cereal yields  FAOSTAT  2010-
2014 
Area-weighted average cereal 
yields in Mcal/ha per country 
(average for 2010-2014). 
3 Agricultural rents The Changing Wealth of Nations (World Bank 
2011b) 
2005 Agricultural land rents (% GDP) 
4 Financing needs Data on financing needs for development 
infrastructure (water, electricity, sanitation, ICT 
and roads provided by (Jakob et al. 2016).  
2010 Total financial needs for 
infrastructure (% GDP)  
5 Existing tax 
distortions 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2016a).  
MRY Sum of customs and other import 
duties and taxes on exports (% 
GDP) 
6 Distributional effects FAO 2014: The State of Food and Agriculture 
Innovation in family farming (FAO 2014) 
2014 Shares of agricultural holdings 
(%) for land size area between 0 
and 2 ha.  
7 Quality of Land 
Administration Index 
Registering Property – Doing Business Report 
2015-2016 (World Bank Group 2015) 
2015 Quality of the land administration 
index (estimate, normalized 
between values 0-1) 
8 Control of 
Corruption Index 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
(Kauffmann and Kraay 2016; World Bank 
2016b) 
2015 Control of Corruption (estimate, 
normalized between values 0-1)  
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7.5. Results of the Pareto ordering 
Figure 9a. Typology results - Pareto frontiers for the different indicators: (a) Quality of Land Administration index and (b) 
Control of Corruption Index vs. deforestation (1, 2), yield production (3, 4) and agricultural land rents (5, 6).  
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Figure 9b. Typology results - Pareto frontiers for the different indicators: (a) Quality of Land Administration index and (b) 
Control of Corruption Index vs. financial needs (7, 8), yield gap (9, 10), and share of small farm holders (11, 12).  
 
 
 
List of Pareto performance (all indicators) for each world region, including only countries which lie on 
the first three Pareto frontiers. Additionally, the countries are indicated (bold) where household data 
with information on land ownership, land size, land value and income is available with survey years since 
2005 and underlined font indicates selected countries for case studies. 
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Table 10 Pareto performance for each world region (descending order).  
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
Sub-Saharan Africa South East Asia 
and the Pacific 
Europe & Central 
Asia 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
Costa Rica Rwanda Bhutan Georgia Jordan 
Jamaica Burkina Faso Fiji Lithuania Morocco 
Uruguay Namibia Malaysia Latvia Tunisia 
Chile Botswana Vanuatu Macedonia, Iran 
Dominica Benin Lao PDR Turkey Algeria 
Honduras Congo, Dem. Rep. Mongolia Armenia  
Colombia Senegal Indonesia Belarus  
Grenada Togo Nepal Kyrgyz Republic 
Guatemala Cameroon Vietnam Moldova 
Brazil Central African Rep. Papua New Guinea Poland  
El Salvador Cote d'Ivoire Bangladesh Russian Federation 
Panama Ethiopia China Albania  
Peru Kenya India Azerbaijan  
Dominican Republic Madagascar Maldives Romania  
Mexico Mozambique Philippines   
Nicaragua Uganda Sri Lanka   
Venezuela, RB Lesotho Pakistan   
 Mauritius Thailand   
 Ghana    
 Angola    
 Mali    
 South Africa    
 Zambia    
 Congo, Rep.    
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7.6. Tax systems in case study countries  
Table 11. Taxation systems in selected countries: Rwanda, Ghana, Peru. 
 Rwanda Ghana Peru 
Property tax Levied on registered land and 
buildings/houses whether in use 
or not, according to rates 
determined by the districts. The 
tax varies from district to 
district. 
Real Property Levy: 
usage of property. 
Taxes rates range 
between The rates 
range from 0.5% to 
3% (although in Accra 
rates are much higher) 
Levied on the value of urban and rural real 
estate property. 
Progressive cumulative scale:  
0-15 TU: 0.2% 
15-60 TU: 0.6% 
>60 TU: 1% 
Transfer Taxes Yes No Levied on all transfers of urban and rural 
real estate property. The taxpayer is the 
purchaser of the property. Taxable base: 
transaction value. Tax rate is 3% 
Stamp Tax NA Conveyance or sale: 
Applicable rate ranging 
from 0.25% to 1%. 
Leases: rates range 
from 0.5% to 1% of 
the consideration (also 
dependent on the lease 
period).  
NA 
Income Tax 0-30,000 RWF: 0% 
30,001-100,000 RWF: 20% 
>100,001 RWF: 30% 
0-2592 GH: 0% 
Next 1296 GH: 5% 
Next 1812: 10% 
Next 28180: 17.5% 
Exceeding 38880: 
25% 
Non-residents: 20% 
0-5 TU: 8% 
5-20 TU: 14% 
20-35 TU: 17% 
35-45 TU: 20% 
> 45 TU: 30% 
Capital gains NA When gain exceeds 
GH¢50: 15% (land, 
buildings, business 
assets including 
goodwill and shares of 
a resident company) 
0,05 
Social Security 
Contributions (as 
% gross salary) 
Employer: 5%; employee: 3%  5.5%-13% gross 
salaries 
Health: 9%; Pension funds: 13% 
Standard VAT 
rate (%) 
18% 15%; In addition, a 
National Health 
Insurance Levy of 2.5% 
is imposed on the 
supply of goods and 
services in Ghana and 
the importation of 
goods and supply of 
imported services. 
18% 
Inheritance, 
estate, and gift 
taxes 
NA NA NA 
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 Rwanda Ghana Peru 
Luxury and 
excise taxes 
Locally manufactured goods and 
imported equivalents. 150% is 
levied on cigarettes; 60% on 
beer; 70% on brandies, liquors, 
and whisky; and 8% on 
telephone communication. 
There is also excise duty on 
motor vehicles ranging between 
5% and 15%. 
NA Fuel, cigarettes, beer, liquor, and vehicles, 
is subject to excise tax. 
Corporate 
income tax rate 
(%) 
30 25% (standard rate; 
many exceptions) 
28 
Withholding tax 
rates (%) 
(Dividends / 
Interest / 
Royalties) 
 
Resident: 15 / 15 / 15; 
Non-resident: 15 / 15 / 15 
  
Resident: NA; 
Non-resident: 6.8 / 4.99 / 30 
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Table 12. Taxation systems in selected countries: Nicaragua, Indonesia, Vietnam  
 Nicaragua Indonesia Vietnam 
Property tax The tax rate is 1% of the taxable 
value, but since taxable value is 
set at 80% of the cadastral value 
(or, as the case may be, self-
declared value), the rate is really 
0.8%. 
Exemptions: Residential 
properties less than 10,000 
colones (in general) or 40,000 
colones (in Managua) are 
exempt. In rural areas, this 
exemption may include up to 1 
hectare of land. There are 
further exemptions 
Land and buildings tax (PBB): due 
annually at maximum 0.3% of the 
regional government-determined 
market value. 
The municipal 
authorities levy a tax on 
real estate. 
A combination of land 
use charges and 
registration fees, land 
use right transfers and 
sales of state-owned 
houses, and land rent 
taxes on agricultural and 
housing land.  
Transfer Taxes Property transfers are subject to 
a 1%-3% pre-payment income 
tax on the purchase price. While 
most sellers ask the buyer to pay 
it, you should be aware that it is 
a pre-payment of income tax; 
therefore, it is legally payable by 
the seller. 
Land and Building Transfer Duty: 
The land and building transfer duty 
is levied at a flat rate of 5%, and is 
charged to the seller. The tax base is 
the transfer value of the property. 
There is a non-taxable amount 
which varies per region.  
Transfer of land use 
rights and 
gifts/winnings or prizes 
(excluding casino 
winnings) also are 
taxable 
Stamp Tax 1% property value, with a 
maximum amount of US$1,370 
Stamp duty on land and building 
transfer (BPHTB): at 5% of the 
greater of the transaction value or 
the regional government-
determined market value. 
A stamp duty at rates of 
0.5% to 2% 
applies on the transfer 
of property. 
Income Tax For resident individuals, income 
tax (IR) is calculated on a 
progressive tax rate, up to a 
maximum of 30%. For non-
residents, any income 
originating from within 
Nicaragua is taxed at a flat 15%.  
0-50 million: 5% 
50-200 million: 15% 
200-250 million: 25% 
> 500 million:30% 
Progressive rates 
ranging from 5% to 
35% apply to residents, 
while nonresidents are 
subject to a flat rate of 
20%. 
Capital gains Capital gains on property are 
treated as ordinary taxable 
income. Liable for tax on such 
earnings, up to a maximum of 
35.5%, although a typical rate is 
around 10%.  
see Transfer taxes Capital gains derived 
from a capital 
assignment are subject 
to a 20% tax on gains. 
Social Security 
Contributions (as % 
gross salary) 
6.25% gross salary Employer: 11.5%; employee: 4%  Vietnamese employees 
are required to make SI, 
HI and UI contributions 
at rates of 8%, 1.5% and 
1% of the employee’s 
salary, respectively. 
Foreign employees are 
subject only to HI. 
Standard VAT rate 
(%) 
15% 10% Rates are 0%, 5% and 
10%  
Inheritance, estate, 
and gift taxes 
A charge of 4% is levied on the 
gift or inheritance of property 
NA In excess of VND10 
million at 10% 
Luxury and excise 
taxes 
NA Luxury-goods sales tax (LGST) - 
rates currently ranging from 10% 
to 125% depending on good (for 
example luxury cars, apartments 
and houses) 
NA 
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 Nicaragua Indonesia Vietnam 
Corporate income tax 
rate (%) 
The standard corporate rate is 
30%. Small and medium-sized 
enterprises are subject to a tax 
of 1% on income in excess of 
NIO 40 million. 
25 The standard corporate 
rate is 20%. The rate for 
enterprises operating in 
the oil and gas and 
natural resource sectors 
ranges from 32% to 
50%, depending on the 
project. 
Withholding tax 
rates (%) (Dividends / 
Interest / Royalties) 
Resident: 10 / 10 / 10; 
Non-resident: 15 / 15 / 15 
 
Resident: 15 / 15 / 15; 
Non-resident: 20 / 20 / 20 
 
Resident: - / 5 / 10; 
Non-resident: - / 5 / 10.  
7.7. Household databases used  
Table 13. Household survey data sources. 
Country  Year Database  
Rwanda 2013-2014 Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV4), 2013-2014, Cross-Sectional 
Sample 
Peru  2015 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2015 – Encuesta Continua 
Nicaragua  2014 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida 2014 
Indonesia  2014-2015 Indonesian Family Life Survey 5 (IFLS 5) 
 
7.8. Determining the land rent component of properties 
In the household surveys, households are typically asked to state the value of the property they own, 
instead of separate information on the land alone.. Hence, we need to infer the land rent from the 
property value that is composed of land rent plus the value of structure (building) on the land. For this, 
we use additional information on structures and accessibility to certain public facilities. We estimate the 
property value based on this information and decompose it into a part that is related to the value of 
structure S and a part related to the value of land L (see Table 14). The basic regression model is  
݌௜ = ߙௌ ௜ܵ + ߚௌ + ߙ௅ܮ௜ + ߚ௅ + ߝ௜  
where ݌௜ = log (ܲ ௜ܸ) is the log of the property value rent ܲ ௜ܸ of household i, ௜ܵ a vector of the structure 
variables (mostly dummies or categorical variables) that affect the value of the building, ܮ௜ a vector of 
variables that determine the land rent (see Table 14) and ߝ௜  the error term. ߙௌ, ߙ௅ , ߚ௅, ߚௌ are to be 
estimated. ߚ௅ indicates the pure land rent without any improvements due to ܮ௜ and ߚௌ the value of a 
building without any improvements. The estimated land value rent is ܮ෢ܸ௜ = exp൫ߙො௅ܮ௜ + ߚመ௅൯ and the 
estimated land value share of the property rent is accordingly ܮܸ෢ܵ ௜ = ௅௏෢ ೔௉௏෢ ೔ = ଵୣ୶୮(ఈෝೄௌ೔) ௘ഁ෡ೄ. One major 
problem is that the regression constants ߚ௅ , ߚௌ are undetermined and only the sum ߚ௅ + ߚௌ is 
determined. We solve this issue by assuming that there exists property with a lent rent value share of 
one hundred percent, i.e. where the value of the structure is zero. Hence, we normalize ݁ఉ෡ೄ such that max௜ ܮܸ෢ܵ ௜ = 1 after excluding the top 1% of the ܮܸ෢ܵ ௜ to account for outliers. 
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Table 14 Land and structure shares of property rent values: Regression factors  
Country Structure factors (S)  Land factors (L)  
Rwanda Dwelling type, number of rooms, wall 
material, rood material, floor material, 
cooking system, toilet system, water 
source, maintenance costs, lighting 
system.  
Habitat type, surface area, distance from here to nearest (15): 
clean water source, food market shop, market for selling farm 
products, public transport stage, all-wealth roads, primary 
schools, secondary schools, district hospital, health center, 
administrative offices, internet services, public telephone in m2, 
environmental catastrophes nearby.  
Peru Dwelling type, number of rooms, wall 
material, roof material, floor material, 
dwelling construction assisted by expert 
(yes/no), housing adequacy, basic 
services in the house, energy use for light 
and cooking, construction license (yes, 
no), overcrowding (yes/no).  
Type of settlement (according to population size), region, 
location (urban/rural), type of habitat, entitled property 
(yes/no), water system available (drink and wastewater), potable 
water available, environmental quality of water, electricity 
availability (lighting and cooking), and school nearby.  
Nicaragua  Dwelling type, number of rooms 
(additional to bathrooms and kitchen), 
wall material, roof material, floor 
material, renovations (whether done and 
spending), air conditioning.  
Region, location (urban/rural), type of access (e.g. paved road, 
path, river), water main connection (yes/no), connection to 
electricity grid (yes/no); availability of a garbage collection 
system, distance to medical center (transportation time), 
distance to school.  
Indonesia Dwelling type, house size, number of 
rooms, wall material, roof material, floor 
material, ventilation, kitchen location 
(outside vs. inside the house), 
renovations (done by type and 
spending).  
District (dummies), existence of a yard, distance to main water 
source, distance to drinking water, distance to medical services 
(knowledge about nearby services and transportation time), 
availability of a garbage collection system , other characteristics 
of the quality of land (e.g. house is surrounded by water).  
 
Figure 10 and Table 15 show the main results from regression: A histogram of land value shares for 
rural and urban households and some summary statistics on the estimated land value shares. Contrary to 
urban economics literature (Alonso 1964; E. S. Mills 1967; Muth 1968; E. Mills and Hamilton 1995), 
land value shares are higher in rural areas than in urban ones. For example, in Indonesia, rural areas have 
a median land value share of 52 percent whereas in urban areas it is only 45 percent of the property 
value. These shares look similar as the ones resulting from the regressions for Peru, Nicaragua and 
Rwanda.  
Figure 10. Regression results: land shares for all households according to urban and rural locations. Rwanda (a), Peru (b), 
Nicaragua (c) and Indonesia (d); mean values.  
  
 a)                                                                b)                                        
     67 
 
 
 
 
   
 c)                                                              d)      
 
Table 15 Regression outcomes: mean and standard deviation of the land value shares for the 4 countries (and the number 
of HHs included), for urban and rural areas. 
 Obs Rural Urban 
 N° HH Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
Rwanda 12981 0.55 0.00 0.35 0.00 
Peru 10893 0.53 0.00 0.31 0.00 
Nicaragua 5254 0.56 0.00 0.39 0.00 
Indonesia 9111 0.52 0.00 0.45 0.00 
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7.9. Case studies: additional information on quantitative 
analysis 
Table 16. Further results of the micro simulation 
 Rwanda Peru Nicaragua Indonesia 
Tax payers in suggested scheme, N° HH (%) 2,219,040 (89%) 7,741,249 
(91%) 
1,069,663 
(75%) 
64,082,198 
(91%) 
 with land value of poorest quintile exempted 1,434,397 (57%) 5,414,039 
(63%) 
712,114 (50%) 34,623,758 
(49%) 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) at 25% tax rate 1.35 0.25 1.87 0.86 
 with land value of poorest quintile exempted 0.98 0.15 1.45 0.61 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) at 50% tax rate 2.69 0.49 3.74 1.71 
 with land value of poorest quintile exempted 1.96 0.30 2.91 1.22 
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7.9.1.  Ownership 
Figure 11. Ownership shares for different income quintiles (x-axis), for different land uses and location (urban and rural 
areas): Rwanda (a), Peru (b), Nicaragua (c) and Indonesia (d).  
    
 a)                                                                    b)                                        
   
 c)                                                               d)                 
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7.9.2.  Rent as a percentage of income 
Figure 12 Rent as a percentage of income for different quintiles (x-axis) and land uses (median): Rwanda (a), Peru (b), 
Nicaragua (scale 0-35%) (c) and Indonesia (d). Only households owning the respective land type considered.  
    
 a)                                                         b)                                        
  
 c)                                                            d)                                       
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7.9.3.  Median rent values  
Figure 13 Median rent value for different quintiles (x-axis) and land uses in US $ (PPP): Rwanda (a), Peru (b), Nicaragua 
(scale 0-8000 US$) (c) and Indonesia (d).  
   
 a)                                                              b)                                        
  
 c)                                                                    d)       
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7.9.4.  Suggested tax: tax-free amount based on land uses and location 
Figure 14 Distributional implications of a land tax system with a tax-free amount: Tax paid by each household as a 
percentage of total income as income quintiles (x-axis) for a 25 percent and 50 percent tax rate for the linear and the 
nonlinear system for Rwanda (a), Peru (b), Nicaragua (c) and Indonesia (d); (median). Tax-free amount based on land uses 
and location (urban, rural).  
     
a.1)                                                                a.2)                                        
    
b.1)                                                              b.2)        
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c.1)                                                               c.2)                                        
   
d.1)                                                              d.2)                                        
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7.10. Agricultural land rents worldwide 
Table 17 GTAP and World Bank Agricultural Land Rents. GTAP Land rents are from 2001; World Bank Land rents are from 
2010 data; both have been adjusted to 2016 US$. Source (H.-L. Lee et al. 2009; World Bank 2011a).Values with “*” for 
the World Bank may be misleading as much of its land rent comes from urban areas, not well represented in the World 
Bank database.  
 GTAP agriculture land rent World Bank Land 
Rents 
Country Agricultural land 
rent (million 2016 
US$) 
SAGE Land 
cover (1000h) 
Average per ha. land 
rent 
(2016 US$) 
Agricultural land rent 
(million 2016 US$) 
Hong Kong, China 549 286 1892 3* 
Korea, Rep. 11291 9495 1189 5304 
Switzerland 1936 4037 479 2095 
Netherlands 1353 3220 421 4029 
Singapore 119 310 385 0* 
Denmark 1653 5216 317 2136 
Sri Lanka 2193 7072 310 1363 
Japan 11400 39938 286 11477 
Germany 10274 36576 280 12758 
Italy 7567 29358 258 13642 
Bangladesh 3618 15334 236 8110 
Belgium 710 3544 200 2410 
Austria 1610 8159 198 2029 
Philippines 5807 29996 194 12281 
India 59350 309374 191 117691 
France 10078 55032 183 17249 
Rest of FT of the 
Americas 
1733 9707 178 - 
United Kingdom 4696 26429 178 6846 
Bulgaria 1675 11155 151 1497 
Czech Republic 1186 8018 148 1462 
Greece 1544 12706 122 3796 
Poland 3799 31557 121 10114 
Thailand 6140 51464 119 13592 
Ireland 934 7992 117 2149 
Hungary 1017 9272 110 2171 
Romania 2463 24190 102 6736 
Croatia 595 6357 93 671 
Spain 4683 50117 93 12797 
Portugal 938 10976 85 1732 
Vietnam 2252 30607 73 10182 
Albania 191 2804 68 595 
Rest of South Asia 11650 172583 68 - 
Rest of the Caribbean 783 12108 64 - 
China 61549 959967 64 195899 
Indonesia 11235 179528 63 32075 
Slovak Republic 304 4905 62 679 
United States 57948 944153 62 91101 
Mexico 11821 201568 59 13427 
Slovenia 136 2364 58 0 
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Central America 2908 57628 51 - 
Malaysia 1590 35898 45 1971 
Rest of Europe 776 17742 43 - 
Finland 1328 34690 38 3360 
Uruguay 621 19022 33 1323 
Venezuela, RB 3006 92272 33 3829 
Turkey 2265 80189 29 17004 
Rest of Southeast Asia 3253 115475 29 - 
Sweden 1225 45343 28 2791 
Colombia 3059 118348 26 10626 
Chile 1964 85476 24 5819 
New Zealand 698 31253 22 5824 
Estonia 105 4681 22 0 
Lithuania 174 8307 21 762 
Uganda 439 21085 21 3949 
Rest of EFTA 930 45562 21 - 
Morocco 817 43195 18 3440 
Tunisia 275 15911 17 1522 
Rest of Form. Soviet 
Union 
8562 498236 17 - 
Argentina 4544 281209 16 13368 
Rest of East Asia 2505 166020 16 - 
Peru 1795 132233 13 4925 
Latvia 77 6441 12 405 
Rest of Middle East 5544 527500 10 - 
Rest of Andean Pact 1302 133998 9 - 
Malawi 88 10247 9 666 
Rest of North Africa 3796 494191 8 - 
South Africa 867 124641 7 6885 
Tanzania 633 91472 7 0 
Rest of South America 519 85625 7 - 
Canada 5841 991138 7 13782 
Rest of Oceania 233 41579 5 - 
Zimbabwe 221 40476 5 979 
Brazil 4470 852846 5 100879 
Australia 3960 784874 5 13111 
Madagascar 258 61660 4 1568 
Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
4563 1422515 3 - 
Russian Federation 5283 1689470 3 23524 
Zambia 128 74768 1 498 
Mozambique 132 79791 1 866 
Rest of S. African Cust. 
Union 
86 87524 1 - 
Botswana 55 58571 1 179 
Rest of S. African Dev. 
Com. 
301 362519 1 - 
Taiwan 2245 0 - - 
Rest of North America 9 0 - - 
Luxembourg 109 0 - 103 
Cyprus 35 0 - 0 
Malta 18 0 - 84 
Total 402380 13299093 0 - 
  
